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I INTRODUCTION 
They that can give up essential liberty to obtain a little temporary safety deserve neither 
liberty nor safety. 
1 
Reconciliation of the fundamental right to liberty with safety or security concerns 
has become a topic of serious debate in recent years in a world facing what has been 
described as a war on terrorism.2 Indefinite detention of persons for reasons of safety and 
security (including of suspected terrorists) was recently the subject of decisions from each 
of the pre-eminent courts in the United Kingdom, the United States of America (the 
United States) and Australia. In the United Kingdom and the United States this issue 
arose in the context of legislation implemented in response to the terrorist attacks on the 
United States on 11 September 2001. In Australia this issue arose in the context of the 
detention of a non-citizen who arrived in Australia without a passport or a visa and who 
could not be deported because no other state was willing to accept him. In the Australian 
case there was no evidence before the court that the appellant posed safety or security 
concerns. 
In New Zealand recently, the Supreme Court (NZSC) considered the issue of 
detention for security reasons in proceedings concerning Ahmed Zaoui. One issue before 
the court was whether Mr Zaoui could be lawfully detained while challenges to the state's 
assessment of whether he posed a security threat (which if such an assessment was made 
could result in him being deported under the Immigration Act 1987 (NZ) (the Immigration 
Act)) progressed through our court system. Mr Zaoui was detained in prison for nearly 
two years without charge during the process of various proceedings challenging both his 
detention and classification as a security threat until the NZSC granted him bail in 
November 2004.3 
1 Benjamin Franklin cited in John Bartlett Familiar Quotations (10 th edition, 1919). 
2 Though this term has been described as not a legally useful notion certainly in the European context 
and it is suggested that there is not much evidence that post-September 11 conditions are regarded as of 
a wholly different order such that the orthodoxies of human rights analysis cannot be applied to them: 
Colin Warbrick "The European Response to Terrorism in an Age of Human Rights" (2004) 15 EJIL 
989, 992 . 
3 Zaoui v Attorney-General and the Superintendent, Auckland Central Remand Prison [2005] I NZLR 
577 (SC). 
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This paper concludes that none of the superior courts in the four jurisdictions 
under discussion gave sufficient consideration to the permissible limits on the right to 
liberty contained in the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights4 (ICCPR). If 
they had done so, in at least the case from the United States, this could have made a 
difference to the substantive result. 
The right to liberty includes freedom from arbitrary detention. This right has been 
an important feature of the legal systems of the United Kingdom, the United States, 
Australia, and New Zealand for hundreds of years. 5 The legal systems of the latter three 
states were developed from the legal system in the United Kingdom which protected the 
fundamental right to liberty by way of the writ of habeas corpus.6 This procedure 
continues to be available in all four jurisdictions under discussion. 
The right to liberty is only effective if those in detention can have speedy recourse 
to the courts; though the circumstances in which such recourse should be available and the 
nature of the review exercise undertaken by the courts have given rise to continuing 
disputes in a number of jurisdictions.7 Such disputes are seen in the five cases under 
discussion. 
The fundamental right to liberty has more recently been affirmed, as well as 
circumscribed by specific internationally agreed limits, in article 9(1) of the ICCPR which 
has been ratified by all four states under discussion.8 As well, the United Kingdom is a 
party to the European Convention on Human Rights9 (ECHR) which affirms the right to 
liberty in article 5(1) of that Convention. 
4 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (19 December 1966) 999 UNTS 172. 
5 Traceable back to Chapter 39 of the Magna Carta 1215 which provides: no freeman shall be ... 
imprisoned ... save by the lawful judgment of his peers or by the law of the land ; discussed in Re S-C 
(Mental Patient: Habeas Corpus) [I 996] QB 599, 603 ; referred to in Richard Clayton & Hugh 
Tomlinson The law of Human Rights (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2000) 449-450. 
6 Habeas corpus was originally a procedural mechanism of the common law adopted by the courts to 
bring someone before a superior court so that the court could exercise jurisdiction, both civil and 
criminal, over them, in particular to assess the validity of the detention : Zaoui v Attorney-General and 
the Superintendent, Auckland Central Remand Prison, above n 3, para 39; the right to habeas corpus 
was first recognised in legislation in the Habeas Corpus Act 1679 (UK) . 
7 Clayton & Tomlinson, above n 5, 449 . 
8 By the United Kingdom on 20 May 1976; by the United States on 8 June 1992; by Australia on 13 
August 1980; and by New Zealand on 28 December 1978. 
9 Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms ( 4 November 1950) 213 
UNTS 222. 
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The social and political context in which the ICCPR and the ECHR were both 
drafted is important. This was following a time of world wide war involving extensive 
military action, loss of life and destruction of property. This experience is accepted as 
being a primary motivation for the creation of the United Nations and the international 
treaties affirming fundamental human rights. With that recent experience the states who 
drafted the ICCPR considered it important to provide recognition for a universal right to 
liberty subject only to narrow limits. It is important to bear in mind a comparison of the 
state of affairs experienced by many states during the second world war with the recent 
war on terrorism which some now claim requires substantial infringements on the right to 
liberty for reasons of security. This paper takes the view that the circumstances facing the 
world currently do not justify the infringements on the right to liberty being claimed as 
necessary to fight this war. 
At the international level the means of promoting compliance with international 
treaties include recommendations from treaty monitoring bodies following receipt of 
regular reports from party states. 10 As well, the (first) Optional Protocol to the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
11 (Optional Protocol) provides a 
complaints mechanism for particular cases where domestic remedies have been exhausted. 
Where states have ratified the Optional Protocol the United Nations Human Rights 
Committee (UNHRC) will, in cases brought before it, be the ultimate evaluator of a state's 
compliance with the ICCPR. 12 Because of this, in states subject to the Optional Protocol 
process, the UNHRC's jurisprudence should be persuasive in cases before the domestic 
courts involving consideration ofrights recognised in the ICCPR.
13 
1° For example the UNHRC said in respect ofNew Zealand 's 4th periodic report it was concerned that 
the impact of legislative measures taken in response to the events of 11 September 200 I and Security 
Council resolution 1373 on New Zealand's obligations under the Covenant may not have been fully 
considered, there were possible negative effects of new legislation on asylum seekers, and there was an 
absence of monitoring mechanisms with regard to the expulsion ofthose suspected of terrorism which 
could pose risks to their personal safety: UNHRC "Concluding observations of the Human Rights 
Committee: New Zealand" (26 July 2002) CCPR/C0/75/NZL para 11. 
11 Of the states under discussion only Australia and NZ have ratified the Optional Protocol though the 
United Kingdom is subject to the jurisdiction of the European Court of Human Rights by way of a 
similar complaints mechanism under the Protocol to the ECHR (20 March 1952) 213 UNTS 262 . 
12 For example: " ... since New Zealand 's accession to the Optional Protocol the United Nations Human 
Rights Committee is in a sense part of this country's judicial structure, in that individuals subject to 
New Zealand jurisdiction have direct rights of recourse to it" : Tavita v The Minister of immigration 
[I 994] 2 NZLR 257, 266 (CA). 
13 For example: " ... while in no way binding, the Committee ' s approach to the concept of 
discrimination is of direct relevance to New Zealand jurisprudence on the subject" : Quilter v Attorney-
General (1997) 4 HRNZ 170, 227 (CA). 
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However, these international mechanisms do not alone provide a sufficient check 
on failures by states to comply with the ICCPR. Because a fundamental human right is at 
issue, domestic courts also need to play a role in respect of state compliance with the 
ICCPR. This includes acting to uphold the rule of law and human rights while countering 
terrorism.14 Domestic courts can in their interpretation role ensure that legislation is 
strictly construed when determining whether any particular instance of detention is 
authorised by that legislation. Legislation needs to expressly permit detention claimed to 
be necessary to address security concerns so that such detention is clearly authorised by 
Parliament. This is necessary to ensure democratic legitimacy and accountability in this 
important area. Courts should not endorse executive action which infringes the right to 
liberty pursuant to generally worded legislation. 
Where specific remedies including habeas corpus are not available to the courts, 
including for the reason that legislation authorising detention is clear, it is suggested that 
courts can at least play a role in monitoring state practice in terms of compliance with 
international treaty obligations by way of providing an analysis and comment upon these 
obligations. It is within domestic jurisdictions that fundamental rights are either respected 
or not. It is therefore in domestic jurisdictions where there needs to be at least some 
monitoring of states' compliance with treaties ratified by states. This role it is suggested is 
consistent with the historical role of common law courts as guardians of liberty. 
Part II of this paper discusses the right to liberty as defined and circumscribed in 
both the ICCPR and the ECHR. 
Part III discusses recent international express10ns of concern about the use of 
administrative detention for dealing with threats to security. Some of these expressions of 
concern include discussion of what role domestic courts should undertake in relation to 
such detention. The suggestion is made by some that domestic courts cannot ignore this 
widespread concern. 
14 International Commission of Jurists "The Berlin Declaration" (2005) 27 HRQ 350, 355. 
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Part IV of this paper discusses the role domestic courts can and should play to at 
least monitor and provide guidance for state practice in terms of compliance by states with 
their obligations under the ICCPR (and the ECHR) and the various legal bases which 
provide the opportunity for this. 
Part V contains an analysis of five recent decisions concerning the right to liberty 
in the context of challenges to administrative detention from each of the pre-eminent 
courts in the United Kingdom, the United States, Australia and New Zealand. As well, 
part V provides an assessment in each case of the extent to which the four courts 
considered their respective states' compliance with the ICCPR. 
This paper concludes on a somewhat pessimistic note because although views will 
differ on whether in any of the cases discussed in this paper detention was justified 
(though in the cases from the United Kingdom, the United States and New Zealand it is 
difficult to make this assessment because only limited information was provided 
concerning the security threat said to be posed by the individuals concerned because of a 
claimed interest in protecting classified security sources 15) none of the courts dealt 
comprehensively with the requirements of the ICCPR in relation to detention. In not 
doing so all four courts missed an opportunity to at least provide guidance for future state 
practice and to contribute to wider political and public debate concerning this fundamental 
issue. 
One positive result of the House of Lords decision is that consistent with the view 
of the UNHRC 16 and while acknowledging the real security issues posed by terrorism, the 
court indicated that it favoured security concerns being met by means other than detaining 
persons on mere suspicion, without trial and perhaps indefinitely. This paper takes the 
view that detention should not be and should not become a default option or even a 
15 United Kingdom: see Warbrick, above n 2, I O 13 discussing A and others v Secretary of State for the 
Home Department (30 July 2002) SIAC, SC/1-7/2002 (CA); United States: Hamdi v Rumsfeld 
<http://straylight.law.cornell.edu/supct/search/display.html?terms=hamdi&url=/supct/html/03-
6696.ZS.html> (last accessed 2 October 2005) (SC) 4-6 O'Connor J; New Zealand: Zaoui v Attorney-
General and the Superintendent, Auckland Central Remand Prison, above n 3, paras 62-65. 
16 The UNHRC has made clear that detention pursuant to legislation can be or become arbitrary if a 
state party cannot show there are less invasive or intrusive means of achieving the same ends such as 
reporting obligations, sureties or other conditions: C v Australia ICCPR 900/ 1999 (28 October 2002) 
para 8.2, Baban et al v Australia ICCPR I O 14/2001 (6 August 2003) para 7.2 and Bakhtiyari v 
Australia ICCPR I 069/2002 (29 October 2003) para 9.3. 
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common place means of protecting security while this unconventional 17 and to some 
extent Orwellian 18 war on terrorism is pursued. 
II RIGHT TO LIBERTY UNDER THE ICCPR AND THE ECHR 
Following the creation of the United Nations the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights (UDHR) and the ICCPR which both affirm the right to liberty were developed. 19 
All four states under discussion have ratified the ICCPR.20 Only the United Kingdom has 
entered into a reservation concerning the right to liberty under the ICCPR.21 However, 
this reservation is not relevant to the present discussion as the appellants in the House of 
Lords case discussed below were not in the United Kingdom unlawfully. The United 
Kingdom is the only state under discussion which is a party to the ECHR which was 
developed as a regional initiative under the auspices of the United Nations.22 
Concerning the human rights standards contained in the UDHR it has been said:23 
These standards relate to the rights of men and women everywhere, and they restrict the 
rights of governments even in relation to their own subjects. That is undisputed Jaw, 
derived from the Nuremburg doctrine of crimes against humanity and from the human 
rights provisions of the United Nations Charter. It is also a radical departure from the 
older tradition of international law, which was concerned only with the regulation of 
relations between the states. 
17 Hamdi v Rumsfeld, above n 15 , 12 O'Connor J. 
18 See Warbrick, above n 2, 996; who comments in relation to a discussion about Camp Delta at 
Guantanamo Bay: we have been promised by those who would wage war against terrorism an 
Orwellian world of perpetual conflict against an elusive enemy. 
19 UNGA Resolution 217 A(III) (10 December 1948) arts 3, 9 and 13 and ICCPR above n ??, arts 9 and 
12. 
2° For respective dates of ratification see above n 8. 
21 "The Government of the United Kingdom reserves the right to continue to apply such immigration 
legislation governing entry into, stay in and departure from the United Kingdom as they may deem 
necessary from time to time and, accordingly, their acceptance of article 12(4) and of the other 
provisions of the Covenant is subject to the provisions of any such legislation as regards persons not at 
the time having the right under the Jaw of the United Kingdom to enter and remain in the United 
Kingdom. The United Kingdom also reserves a similar right in regard to each of its dependent 
territories" ; entered into by the United Kingdom upon its ratification of the ICCPR on 20 May 1976. 
22 For ratification date see above n 21. 
23 R Q Quentin-Baxter " International Protection of Human Rights" in K J Keith (ed) Essays on Human 
Rights (Sweet & Maxwell (NZ) Ltd, Wellington, 1968) 132, 144. 
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The essential purpose of the ICCPR was to become an indispensable legal means 
for securing worldwide respect for, and observance of, fundamental human rights.24 In 
drafting the ICCPR the United Nations Commission on Human Rights (UN 
Commission on Human Rights) drew upon the experience of regional efforts that 
paralleled codification of human rights by United Nations members in particular the 
ECHR.25 As well, the American Bill of Rights (contained within the United States 
Constitution (US Constitution)) was one of the inspirations for United Nations activity 
in the field of human rights. 26 
The ICCPR was adopted by unanimous vote in the General Assembly on 16 
December 1966. 27 It thus provides unanimous international affirmation of particular 
narrow permissible limits on the right to liberty, building upon previous legal 
understandings in this area. 
A /CCPR 
1 Article 9(1) JCCPR 
Article 9(1) ICCPR provides: 
Everyone has the right to liberty and security of the person . No one shall be subject 
to arbitrary arrest or detention. No one shall be deprived of his liberty except on 
such grounds and in accordance with such procedure as are established by law. 
In 1982 in General Comment 828 the UNHRC pointed out that article 9 "is 
applicable to all deprivations of liberty including immigration control etc".29 Further, that: 
"if so-called preventive detention is used, for reasons of public security, it must be 
24 Yratislav Pechota "The Development of the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights" in Louis Henkin 
( ed) The international Bill of Rights: the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (Columbia University 
Press, New York, 1981) 36. 
25 Pechota, above n 24, 40 . 
26 Quentin-Baxter, above n 23 , 132. 
27 Pechota, above n 24, 64 . 
28 UNHRC "General Comment 8: Article 9: Right to Liberty and Security of Persons" ( 1982) A/37/40 
95 . 
29 General Comment 8, above n 28, para I . 
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controlled by these same provisions, ie it must not be arbitrary, and must be based on 
grounds and procedures established by law".30 
Another affirmation of the right to liberty is contained in article 12(1) ICCPR 
which affirms the right to liberty of movement within state territories. Similarly to the 
right to liberty in article 9(1) the ICCPR provides that article 12(1) can be subject only to 
restrictions provided by law.31 However, article 12(1) provides for other limits which are 
not contained in article 9(1). These are that measures which restrict this right must be 
necessary to protect national security, public order or the rights and freedoms of others and 
must be consistent with the other rights recognised in the ICCPR.32 The particular limits 
in article 12(1) will not be considered further because to some extent they mirror the limits 
contained in the derogation provision in article 4(1) ICCPR. 
2 Derogation under article 4(1) ICCPR 
The ability of states to derogate from article 9(1) is limited by article 4(1) ICCPR 
which provides that derogation from a state ' s obligations under the Covenant, including in 
respect of the right to liberty, is permissible only "in a time of public emergency which 
threatens the life of the nation". The qualification that the public emergency must threaten 
the life of the nation was intended to limit the possibility of abuse by states.33 As well, 
when this threshold is met any measures which may be taken are limited "to the extent 
strictly required by the exigencies of the situation, provided that such measures are not 
inconsistent with other obligations under international law and do not involve 
discrimination solely on the ground of race, colour, sex, language, religion or social 
origin". 
30 General Comment 8, above n 28 , para 4. 
31 ICCPR, art 12(3). 
32 ICCPR, art 12(3). 
33 Dominic McGoldrick "The interface between public emergency powers and international law" 
(2004) 2 JICJ 380, 393 . 
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3 Optional Protocol 
Both Australia and New Zealand have signed the Optional Protocol to the ICCPR 
which means that any challenges in respect of detention in these two states can ultimately 
be considered by the UNHRC. 
B ECHR 
Of the states under discussion only the United Kingdom is a party to the ECHR. 
1 Article 5(1) ECHR 
Article 5(1) ECHR provides: 
Everyone has the right to liberty and security of the person. No one shall be 
deprived of his liberty save in the following cases and in accordance with a 
procedure prescribed by law: . . .. (t) the lawful arrest or detention of ... a person 
whom action is being taken with a view to deportation . . .. 
Article 5(1) is thus similar to article 9(1) ICCPR except that it lists specific areas in 
which the right is able to be limited. 
2 Derogation under article 15(1) ECHR 
Article 15(1) ECHR provides that a member state can derogate from its 
obligations under the ECHR "in time of war or other public emergency threatening the life 
of the nation". When this threshold is met the measures taken which derogate from the 
ECHR are limited "to the extent strictly required by the exigencies of the situation, 
provided that such measures are not inconsistent with [the state's] other obligations under 
international law". 
Thus permissible derogation under article 15(1) is substantially similar to that 
under article 4(1) ICCPR. 
14 
3 European Court of Human Rights 
The United Kingdom is also subject to review of its compliance with the 
provisions of the ECHR in particular cases by the European Court of Human Rights 
(ECtHR) under the Protocol to the ECHR.34 
The prov1s1ons of the ECHR and jurisprudence from the ECtHR will not be 
considered separately again in this paper except when discussing the United Kingdom. In 
terms of the general discussion below where the ICCPR is referred to it is considered that 
the discussion applies to the respective ECHR provisions. 
C Commentary on article 9(1) /CCPR 
Article 9(1) contains both a procedural requirement and a substantive requirement. 
These are now discussed in turn. 
I Procedural requirement of article 9(1) JCCPR 
Article 9(1) ICCPR contains a procedural requirement that detention can occur 
only on such grounds and in accordance with such procedures as are established by law. 
The UNHRC has said that this requires detention to be clearly authorised by legislation.35 
Further, the UNHRC has said that executive or administrative detention violates the 
principle oflegality where it is not specifically authorised by clear legislation.36 
It is important to distinguish between the will of Parliament and action taken by 
the executive pursuant to legislation.37 Courts are obliged to apply the will of Parliament 
as expressed through legislation. However, it is uncontroversial that courts also have a 
role to play in ensuring that executive action in relation to detention is authorised by 
legislation. 
34 See above n 11. 
35 See for example: McLawrence vJamaica ICCPR 702/1996 (18 July 1997) para 5.5 . 
36 McLawrence v Jamaica above n 35 , para 5.5 . 
37 See Lord Steyn's extra-judicial comments in Democracy Through Law, Occasional Paper No 12 
(New Zealand Centre for Public Law, Wellington, September 2002) 9- 10. 
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Separate to the question of legality, only where legislation is crystal clear in 
authorising detention, can states claim democratic legitimacy in respect of any 
infringements on the right to liberty. Where legislation is not clear executive action may 
be arbitrary. In this sense the procedural and substantive requirements of article 9(1) 
overlap. 
In two of the cases under discussion (from the United States and Australia) a 
primary issue was whether the legislation in question was sufficiently clear to authorise 
state authorities to indefinitely detain particular persons. For the judges who considered 
that the legislation in question was sufficiently clear to authorise indefinite detention the 
result was to endorse continued detention of the appellants in recognition of Parliamentary 
sovereignty. This reflects a formalist view that the appropriate role of courts is to interpret 
and apply legislation without straying into policy or political decisions concerning the 
substantive result. In the New Zealand case the interpretation issue was whether the 
legislation which clearly authorised detention of Mr Zaoui was also sufficiently clear in its 
terms to override the inherent jurisdiction to grant bail. 
The procedural requirement of article 9(1) ICCPR sits comfortably with the role of 
judges to interpret and apply legislation including to check the legality of executive action 
pursuant to legislation. Thus whether the procedural requirement of article 9(1) is 
specifically incorporated into domestic law or not, it is in effect considered by courts in 
this interpretation role. 
An issue which arises in respect of this point is to what extent a state's wider treaty 
obligations, which have not been incorporated into domestic law, are relevant to the 
court's interpretation exercise. 
2 Substantive requirement of article 9(1) ICCPR 
Article 9(1) also requires that detention not be arbitrary. 
The term 'arbitrary' for the purpose of article 9(1) was discussed during the 
process of drafting the ICCPR. Views differed between states as to whether this term 
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meant simply illegal or whether it included concepts such as justice and reason.38 There 
was little support in the Third Committee of the General Assembly (Third Committee) for 
the view that the term illegal should be used instead of the term arbitrary because the term 
arbitrary was too wide and too indefinite.39 The discussion of the Third Committee 
included comments that: an arbitrary act was any act which violated justice and reason and 
the use of this term was a safeguard against the injustices of states because it applied to 
laws and to acts performed by the executive.40 Paragraph 1 of article 9 in its current form 
was adopted by the Third Committee by 67 votes to none, with five abstentions.41 
More recently the UNHRC has said that "arbitrary" is not to be equated with 
against the law but must be interpreted more broadly to include elements of 
inappropriateness, injustice and lack of predictability.42 This means that remand in 
custody pursuant to lawful arrest must not only be lawful but be reasonable and 
necessary in all the circumstances.43 The element of proportionality is relevant in this 
context.44 
Further, the UNHRC has said that detention can also become arbitrary when it 
continues for a lengthy period and it should be open for review periodically so that the 
grounds said to justify detention can be assessed and so that it not continue beyond the 
period for which the state can provide appropriate justification.45 
Detention may be arbitrary in terms of executive action where it is not clearly 
authorised by legislation. As discussed in the above section courts are generally 
comfortable making such assessments. 
38 Marc J Bossuyt international Covenant on Civil and Political Rights: Guide to the "travaux: 
preparatoires" of the international Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (Oordrecht: M Nijhoff, 
1987) 20 I. 
39 Bossuyt, above n 3 8, 199. 
40 Bossuyt, above n 38,201. 
41 Bossuyt, above n 38,201. 
42 See for example: Mukong v Cameroon ICCPR 458/ 1991 (21 July 1994) para 9.8; and A v Australia 
1CCPR 506/ 1993 (3 April 1997) para 9.2 . 
43 Mukong v Cameroon, above n 42, para 9.8; and A v Australia, above n 42, para 9.2. 
44 A v Australia, above n 42, para 9.2. 
45 A v Australia, above n 42, para 9.4; C v Australia, above n 16, paras 8.2 & 8.3; Baban et al v 
Australia, above n 16, para 7.2; and Bakhtiyari v Australia, above n 16, para 9.2 . 
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In terms of the further substantive requirement of article 9( 1 ), namely whether 
clear legislation (as opposed to executive action pursuant to legislation) is or is not 
arbitrary, the formalist view is that courts have no role to consider such aspects unless 
these have been incorporated into domestic law. This substantive requirement of article 
9(1) has not been incorporated into domestic law in either the United States or Australia. 
This issue is discussed further below in relation to the role of the courts. 
D Commentary on article 4(1) ICCPR 
Article 4(1) ICCPR provides further limits on when, and to what extent, legislation 
can derogate from the right to liberty as defined in article 9( 1 ). 
Some commentators differentiate between the limits contained within particular 
provisions in the ICCPR and the separate derogation provision in article 4. The logic of 
the ICCPR is that, if possible, states should limit rights rather than derogate from them.46 
But rather than there being hard and fast boundaries between limitations and derogations, 
there tends to be an overlap with similar principles, for example proportionality and non-
discrimination, being applicable.47 The lack of clarity about the relationship between 
limits within articles and the derogation provision is noted, however this issue will not be 
considered further in this paper. 
Comments made by members of the UN Commission on Human Rights during an 
early part of the process of drafting article 4(1) included:48 
It was also important that States parties should not be felt free to decide for themselves 
when and how they would exercise emergency powers because it was necessary to 
guard against States abusing their obligations under the Covenant. 
Further:49 
46 McGoldrick, above n 33 , 384. 
47 Iain Cameron National Security and the European Convention on Human Rights (Justus Forlag, 
2000) particularly sections 4 .5, 4.6 and 4 .10; referred to by McGoldrick, above n 33, 383- 384. 
48 Bossuyt, above n 3 8, 83 . 
49 Bossuyt, above n 38, 83-84 . 
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Reference was made to the history of the past epoch during which emergency powers 
had been invoked to suppress human rights. 
The inclusion of the derogation provision in the ICCPR was not controversial. 50 
In 1984 the Siracusa Principles on the Limitation and Derogation Provisions in the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (Siracusa Principles) were 
developed.51 These provide persuasive guidance on the meaning of the derogation 
provision in the ICCPR. Paragraph 39 of the Siracusa Principles requires that measures 
derogating from rights under the ICCPR be taken "only when faced with a situation of 
exceptional and actual or imminent danger which threatens the life of the nation". A 
threat to the life of the nation is defined as one which affects the whole of the population 
and either whole or part of the territory of the state; and threatens the physical integrity of 
the population, the political independence or territorial integrity of the state or the 
existence or basic functioning of institutions indispensable to ensure and protect the rights 
recognised in the Covenant. 52 Paragraph 70(b) states, "no person shall be detained for an 
indefinite period of time, whether detained pending judicial investigation or detained 
without charge". 
In 2001, two months prior to the terrorist attacks on the United States, the UNHRC 
adopted General Comment 29 which also provides guidance on the meaning of article 4.53 
General Comment 29 stated that measures derogating from the provisions of the Covenant 
must be of an "exceptional" and "temporary" nature and the state must have officially 
proclaimed a state of emergency. 54 States must be able to justify not only that such a 
situation constitutes a threat to the life of the nation, but also that measures derogating 
from the Covenant are strictly required.55 States may in no circumstances invoke article 4 
50 McGoldrick, above n 33 , 387. 
51 "Siracusa Principles on the Limitation and Derogation Provisions in the International Covenant on Civil 
and Political Rights" 4 HRNZ 753; which were developed by experts in international law from various 
organisations including the International Commission of Jurists at a meeting in Siracusa, Italy in 1984. 
52 Siracusa Principles, above n 51 , para 39 . 
53 UNHRC "General Comment 29: States of Emergency (Article 4)" (31 August 2001) 
CCPR/C/21/Rev.J/Add.11. 
54 General Comment 29, above n 53 , para 2. 
55 General Comment 29, above n 53 , para 5. 
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as justification for acting m violation of humanitarian law or peremptory norms of 
international law for instance through arbitrary deprivations of liberty. 56 
It is clear that a high threshold applies to when derogation is permissible and as 
well it is clear that a test of strict necessity applies in respect of any measures taken which 
derogate from the right to liberty. 
The earlier discussion in respect of the substantive requirement of article 9(1 ), 
concerning the appropriate role for domestic courts in relation to the provisions of 
international treaties which have not been incorporated into domestic law, also applies 
to the derogation provision in article 4(1) ICCPR in respect of the United States, 
Australia and New Zealand. This issue is discussed further below in relation to the role 
of the courts. 
E Conclusion 
The analysis this paper undertakes in terms of the requirements of article 9(1) 
ICCPR is that the limits contained within the article raise both procedural and substantive 
legal issues. The procedural requirement of article 9(1) is that detention must be expressly 
authorised by legislation. The substantive requirement of article 9(1) is that the detention 
must not otherwise be arbitrary. 
The analysis this paper undertakes in terms of the requirements of the separate 
derogation provision in article 4(1) ICCPR is that this article provides both a threshold for 
when detention contrary to article 9(1) is permissible, including in relation to addressing 
security concerns and including where this is expressly authorised by legislation, as well 
as a restriction on the extent to which detention can be employed to address such concerns. 
The threshold in article 4(1) requires there to be a public emergency threatening the life of 
the nation. The extent to which detention is permissible even in such circumstances is 
limited to measures strictly necessary and which are consistent with other international 
obligations including not being discriminatory. 
56 General Comment 29, above n 53 , para 11. 
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The issue of whether such limits need to be specifically incorporated into domestic 
law as a prerequisite for consideration of these by domestic courts has been mentioned 
above and is discussed further below in relation to the role of the courts. As discussed 
above even where treaty obligations under the ICCPR in respect of the right to liberty 
have not been incorporated into domestic law, in effect the procedural requirement of 
article 9(1) is available to all domestic courts because of their role to interpret legislation 
and thereby check the legality of executive action pursuant to this . It is suggested that 
even where a treaty has not been incorporated into domestic law, where it has been ratified 
by a state, this at least warrants the content of these being considered by courts by way of 
the monitoring role suggested by this paper. 
An associated issue in respect of the role of domestic courts concerns the weight 
which should be given to opinions and comments made by international bodies. This 
paper relies heavily upon such material as did Lord Bingham in the House of Lords 
decision discussed below. Such material must be at least persuasive in relation to the 
work of domestic courts similarly to cases from overseas jurisdictions which while not 
binding are increasingly used for guidance by domestic courts. 
As well, all four states under discussion continue to play an active role in the 
United Nations including by way of membership of various committees. The United 
Kingdom and the United States are members of arguably the most powerful body within 
the United Nations, the United Nations Security Council (UNSC). Domestic courts cannot 
ignore this reality. As will be seen however, the United States Supreme Court (USSC) 
and the majority of the High Court of Australia (HCA) continue to do so. 
Before discussing in more detail the role domestic courts can and should play in 
monitoring states' compliance with the ICCPR limits on detention some recent 
expressions of concern about the use of administrative detention in the war on terrorism 
are set out in part III below. 
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III RECENT EXPRESSIONS OF CONCERN ABOUT DETENTION FOR THE 
PURPOSE OF COUNTERING TERRORISM 
In 2004 the UNSC reminded states that any measures taken to combat terrorism 
must comply with all their obligations under international law including international 
human rights law.57 
That same year the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) reaffirmed that 
any measures derogating from the ICCPR while countering terrorism must be in 
accordance with article 4 in all cases.58 UNGA Resolution 191 emphasised the 
"exceptional and temporary nature of any such derogations".59 Similar comments had 
also been made earlier that same year by the UN Commission on Human Rights.60 
A report of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights in 
December 2004 stated that the Office for the Commissioner for Human Rights found 
strong support for the view that terrorism can and must be dealt with effectively while 
fully respecting international human rights norms and upholding the rule oflaw.61 
In A More Secure World: Our Shared Responsibility, Report of the High-level 
Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change, the Panel records that throughout its regional 
consultations it heard concerns from both governments and civil society organisations that 
the current war on terrorism has in some instances corroded the very values that terrorists 
target: human rights and the rule of law.62 The Panel recommended that a comprehensive 
strategy be developed to counter terrorism and that this strategy include development of 
better instruments for global counter-terrorism cooperation, all within a legal framework 
that is respectful of civil liberties and human rights.63 
57 UNSC Resolution 1566 (8 October 2004) S/RES/ 1566 preamble. 
58 
UNGA Resolution 191 (20 December 2004) A/RES/59/191 para 2 and UNGA Resolution 195 (20 
December 2004) A/RES/59/ 195 para 8. 
59 UNGA Resolution 191 , above n 58, para 2. 
60 
UN Commission on Human Rights Resolution 2004/87 (21 April 2004) E/CN.4/2004/ 127 317, para 
I. 
61 
UNHRC "Promotion and Protection of Human Rights Protection of human rights and fundamental 
freedoms while countering terrorism, Report of the High Commissioner for Human Rights" (16 
December 2004) E/CN.4/2005/ 100, para 19. 
62 
UN High-level Panel "A more secure world: Our shared responsibility Report of the High-level 
Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change" (2004) 48. 
63 UN High-level Panel report, above n 62, 49. 
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In March 2005 the Secretary-General of the United Nations reinforced the need to 
defend human rights in the fight against terrorism.64 His report included the statement: 
In our struggle against terrorism, we must never compromise human rights. When we 
do so we facilitate the achievement of one of the terrorist's objectives. By ceding the 
moral high ground we provoke tension, hatred and mistrust of Governments among 
precisely those parts of the population where terrorists find recruits. 
The United Nations Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) has issued several 
reports in the past year relevant to the present discussion. One of these was a Report by 
the Working Group on Arbitrary Detention.65 For the period under report the working 
group considered cases involving 18 persons in five countries.66 The working group 
considered that detention of 12 of these persons was arbitrary. No opinion was offered in 
respect of the remaining six persons as they had been released at the time of the adoption 
of the working group's opinion. The working group expressed its concern about the 
frequent use of administrative detention (by the executive) and the expanse of emergency 
legislation diluting the right to habeas corpus in the context of the fight against terrorism.67 
It noted that several states had enacted new anti-terror or internal security legislation 
allowing for persons to be detained for an unlimited time, without charge, without the 
detainees being brought before a judge, and without a remedy to challenge the detention.68 
It is also noted that this type of administrative detention aims at circumventing the legal 
time limits governing police custody and pre-trial detention and at depriving the persons 
concerned of the judicial guarantees recognised to all persons suspected or accused of 
having committed an offence.69 The working group was clear that even though such 
detention was occurring pursuant to legislation it raised issues of arbitrariness.70 
The working group also assessed several court decisions, including cases from the 
United Kingdom and the United States. It criticised one case from the United Kingdom, 
64 
UNGA "In larger freedom: towards development, security and human rights for all , Report of the 
Secretary-General to the General Assembly" (21 March 2005) A/59/2005 para 88 . 
65 
UN Commission on Human Rights "Report of the Working Group on Arbitrary Detention" (1 
December 2004) E/CN .4/2005/6. 
66 UNC .. · omm1ss1on on Human Rights, above n 65 , para 60 . 
67 
UN Commission on Human Rights, above n 65 , para 61. 
68 
UN Commission on Human Rights, above n 65 , para 61. 
69 
UN Commission on Human Rights, above n 65 , para 61. 
70 
UN Commission on Human Rights, above n 65, para 63 . 
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which was the decision at Court of Appeal level of the United Kingdom decision 
discussed in this paper, where the Court of Appeal had allowed the use of secret evidence 
to justify indefinite detention.71 
In its recommendations the working group called for states, when taking legitimate 
measures to counter terrorism, to ensure there were effective safeguards against arbitrary 
deprivation of the right to liberty. In particular it recommended effective judicial control 
over detention orders including by way of habeas corpus and ensuring that measures 
restricting resort to judicial control are strictly proportionate to the legitimate need to fight 
against terrorism.72 It stated further that the use of administrative detention under public 
security legislation or migration laws for unlimited time or long periods, without effective 
judicial oversight, as a means to detain persons suspected of involvement with terrorism is 
incompatible with international human rights law.73 
Authoritative bodies outside of the United Nations have also discussed the 
importance of upholding human rights in combating terrorism. For example, the 
International Commission of Jurists (ICJ) meeting in August 2004 adopted the Declaration 
on Upholding Human Rights and the Rule of Law in Combating Terrorism (Berlin 
Declaration).74 The meeting consisted of 160 jurists from all regions of the world. The 
ICJ recorded in the Berlin Declaration that since September 2001 many states have 
developed new counter-terrorism measures that are in breach of their international 
obligations; in adopting measures aimed at suppressing acts of terrorism states must 
adhere strictly to the rule of law, including the core principles of international law and 
obligations of international human rights law; and these principles and obligations define 
the boundaries of permissible and legitimate state action against terrorism.75 The Berlin 
Declaration states that states must ensure that any derogation from a right during an 
emergency is temporary, strictly necessary and proportionate to meeting a specific 
threat.76 Further, that administrative detention must remain an exceptional measure, be 
71 UN Commission on Human Rights, above n 65 , para 64; referring to A and others v Secreta,y of 
State for the Home Department, above n IS . 
72 UN Commission on Human Rights, above n 65, para 75 . 
73 UN Commission on Human Rights, above n 65 , para 77. 
74 The Berlin Declaration, above n 14, 350- 356. 
75 The Berlin Declaration, above n 14, 3 51. 
76 The Berlin Declaration, above n 14, 353 ; compare the Siracusa Principles, above n 51 . 
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strictly time-limited and be subject to frequent and regular judicial supervision.
77 The 
Berlin Declaration emphasises the importance of an independent judiciary and its role in 
reviewing state conduct.78 
The Berlin Declaration describes the judiciary as the protector of the fundamental 
rights and freedoms and the rule of law and as the guarantor of human rights in the fight 
against terrorism.79 It calls on judges to ensure that national laws and the acts of the 
executive relating to counter-terrorism conform to international human rights standards 
and in particular requests judges to wherever possible apply international human rights 
standards and to ensure that judicial procedures such as habeas corpus are implemented.
80 
IV THE ROLE OF DOMESTIC COURTS 
A Incorporation of International Obligations into Domestic Law 
One view of the appropriate role for domestic courts in relation to international 
human rights obligations, including those entered into by states by way of international 
treaties, is that these are only relevant when they have been incorporated into domestic 
law. This view is evident in several of the judgments in the decisions from both the USSC 
and the HCA discussed below. However, this view has been questioned
81 including in 
some of the judgments in the decisions from the HCA and the NZSC discussed below. 
Of the states under discussion only the United Kingdom and New Zealand have 
incorporated recognition of the right to liberty as affirmed and circumscribed by the 
ECHR and the ICCPR, respectively, into domestic legislation. 
The United Kingdom's obligations in respect of the right to liberty under the 
ECHR and therefore in general effect its obligations in respect of the right to liberty in the 
77 The Berlin Declaration, above n 14, 353 . 
78 The Berlin Declaration, above n 14, 352 . 
79 The Berlin Declaration, above n 14, 356 . 
80 The Berlin Declaration, above n 14, 356. 
81 See for example Lord Steyn, above n 37, 8; Sir Geoffrey Palmer "Human Rights and the New 
Zealand Government' s Treaty Obligations" (1999) VUWLR I O; and comments Tavita v The Minister 
of Immigration, above n 12. 
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ICCPR were incorporated into United Kingdom domestic law via the Human Rights Act 
1998 (UK) (UKHRA). 
This has two consequences. First, section 3 UKHRA directs courts to wherever 
possible interpret enactments to be consistent with the ECHR.82 Although as discussed 
below the United Kingdom case did not have to undertake this exercise as the words in the 
relevant legislation were very clear. Second, the UKHRA provides the remedy of a 
declaration of incompatibility which involves determination by the courts of whether state 
action, including by way of legislation, is compatible with the United Kingdom's 
obligations under the ECHR. 83 
New Zealand's obligations in respect of the right to liberty under the IC CPR have 
been incorporated to some extent into domestic law through the New Zealand Bill of 
Rights Act 1990 (NZBORA). The preamble to the NZBORA specifically recognises the 
Act is enacted to affirm its commitment to the ICCPR. The right to liberty is contained in 
section 22 which provides that everybody has the right not to be arbitrarily arrested or 
detained. The derogation provision in article 4(1) ICCPR is not referred to in the 
NZBORA. Rather the right to liberty in domestic law in New Zealand is subject to the 
general limitations provision contained in section 5 NZBORA which provides for rights to 
be subject only to reasonable limits, prescribed by law and demonstrably justified in a free 
and democratic society. 84 
Similarly to section 3 UKHRA, section 6 NZBORA directs courts to wherever 
possible interpret enactments consistently with the rights contained in NZBORA. No 
specific remedy is provided for in the NZBORA for breaches of the Act. 85 
The importance of the incorporation of international obligations under the ICCPR 
( or ECHR) into domestic law is that the courts are given a specific mandate from 
Parliament to review (at least to some extent) the relevant state ' s compliance with these. 
In the United Kingdom this review extends in effect to both the procedural requirement of 
82 UKHRA, s 3. 
83 UKHRA, s 4(2). 
84 
This formulation is also seen in the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, s I , Part I of the 
Constitution Act 1982 (Canada Act 1982 (UK), Sch 8). 
85 
Though a declaration of inconsistency is now available for a breach of s 19 NZBORA relating to 
discrimination pursuant to s 20L and s 921 Human Rights Act 1993 (NZ) . 
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article 9(1) ICCPR and the derogation provision in article 4(1) as these are similar to the 
requirements of the corresponding provisions in the ECHR. The substantive requirement 
of article 9( 1) is not specifically incorporated as the concept of arbitrariness is not referred 
to in the ECHR in relation to the right to liberty. However in relation to the United 
Kingdom, following the enactment of the UKHRA which incorporated the provisions of 
the ECHR into the United Kingdom's domestic law, Warbrick has said the human rights 
components of the rule of law include the protection against the arbitrary exercise of 
power, even if that power has a formal legal base86 and Clayton and Tomlinson have said 
that even where detention is clearly authorised by legislation this also needs to be 
justified on a substantive legal basis. 87 
In New Zealand the review specifically mandated by the NZBORA extends to 
both the procedural and substantive requirements of article 9(1) but does not include the 
derogation provision in article 4(1 ). 
Though the obligations of the United States under the ICCPR are not incorporated 
by specific reference into United States domestic law, relevantly the US Constitution 
provides that treaties entered into by the United States are the "supreme law of the 
land". 88 Although some commentators have suggested that this does not mean that 
international treaties can be applied by the courts in the United States. 89 Even if this is 
correct, the presence of such a clause within the US Constitution supports domestic 
courts in that country giving somewhat more attention to international treaties than 
appears to have occurred to date. 
In terms of a formalist view of the role of courts, as has been discussed above, the 
courts in the United Kingdom, the United States and New Zealand have a specific 
statutory or Constitutional (in the case of the United States) mandate to in effect consider 
some of the requirements of the ICCPR in relation to the right to liberty. Only in the 
86 Warbrick, above n 2, 1013 . 
87 Clayton & Tomlinson, above n 5, paras I 0.90- 10.92 . 
88 US Constitution, art VI cl 2. 
89 
Noah S Leavitt "The REAL ID Act: How It Violates US Treaty Obligations, Insults International 
Law, Undermines Our Security, and Betrays Eleanor Roosevelt ' s Legacy" 
<http :/ /writ.news. find law.corn/ scripts/printer friendl y. pl?page=/leavitt/20050509 .html> (last accessed 
27 September 2005) 2. 
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United Kingdom does this extend to all requirements of the ICCPR, in effect by reference 
to the ECHR. 
B Other Domestic Means of Protecting the Right to Liberty 
Neither the United States nor Australia have specific_ally incorporated any aspect 
of their obligations under the ICCPR relating to the right to liberty into domestic 
legislation (though the US Constitution provides some authority for considering treaty 
obligations). In the United States the fifth and fourteenth Amendments to the US 
Constitution provide for the right not to be deprived of liberty without due process of 
law. This to some extent mirrors the procedural requirement of article 9(1 ). 
The US Constitution also recogruses the "Privilege of the Writ of Habeas 
Corpus" and specifies that this shall not be suspended unless when in cases of rebellion 
or invasion the public safety may require it.90 This provision thus imposes similar 
limits on the suspension of habeas corpus to those in the threshold test contained in the 
derogation provision in article 4(1) ICCPR. 
Legislation in the United States which does not conform with the Constitution 
can be ruled as unconstitutional and thus of no effect. In theory the United States thus 
has the strongest remedy available in respect of legislation which infringes the 
fundamental right to liberty though not as this is defined and specifically circumscribed 
in the ICCPR. 
The Commonwealth of Australia Constitution Act 1900 (the Australian 
Constitution) does not contain any provision relating to fundamental rights including the 
right to liberty. Nor is there any specific reference to the right to liberty in legislation 
enacted since the formation of the Australian Commonwealth. However, Australia is a 
common law country with an historical recognition of the right to liberty. Where 
legislation is not sufficiently clear Australian courts could follow the NZSC decision 
discussed below and grant bail on the basis of the inherent jurisdiction to do so.91 Of 
90 US Constitution, art I 9 cl 2 . 
91 
Zaoui v Attorney-Genera/ and the Superintendent, Auckland Central Remand Prison, above n 3. 
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course the protection of liberty at common law or via the inherent jurisdiction to grant bail 
will not prevail over clear legislation infringing upon this right. 
This paper does not at all discount the importance of the recognition of the right to 
liberty both at common law and under the US Constitution. However, this paper suggests 
that the collective affirmation of the fundamental importance of the human right to liberty 
in the ICCPR (and also in respect of the United Kingdom, the ECHR) as well as 
agreement as to particular and narrow permissible limits on this right, by the international 
community following the second world war, provides an important an persuasive 
benchmark for the assessment by domestic courts of any limits placed on the right.92 
C Habeas Corpus 
The writ of habeas corpus was originally a common law mechanism specifically 
established to allow challenges to detention by state authorities.93 It gives detainees the 
right to be brought before a court to have the legality of their detention assessed by a 
court. Where the detention at issue was not found to be authorised by law the court 
could order that the detainee be released. Each of the states under discussion have all 
now provided for this procedure in legislation. 94 Because habeas corpus is primarily a 
mechanism for testing the legality of detention it in effect permits courts to consider the 
procedural requirement of article 9(1) ICCPR. 
D Suggested Role/or Domestic Courts 
As has been seen, in terms of a formalist view of the appropriate role for courts, 
there are several legal bases, including habeas corpus, for challenging detention within 
the four states under discussion. As will be seen in the case analyses below a number 
of superior court judges in some jurisdictions (notably New Zealand where the majority 
92 
"Rightly or wrongly, the ICC PR is regarded as the prim us inter pares of the universal international 
human rights treaties . It has been widely ratified by states from all continents. As of November 2, 
2003 , there were 151 states parties. For those states it creates a binding treaty obligation," ; 
McGoldrick, above n 33 , 381. 
93 See above n 6. 
94 
Habeas Corpus Act 1679 (UK) ; US Constitution, art I 9 cl 2: Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth), s 398 in 
combination with Federal Courts of Australia Act 1976 (Cth), s 23 : and Habeas Corpus Act 2001 (NZ), 
s 6. 
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takes this view) consider that incorporation of international obligations into domestic 
law is not required for these to be relevant to, persuasive or even determinative m 
respect of, the court ' s consideration oflegislation claimed to authorise detention. 
This paper does not argue either that courts elsewhere should or should not 
follow this lead. That is a subject for another paper. However, it is suggested that even 
where legislation is sufficiently clear to authorise detention (thus on a formalist view of 
the court's role preventing remedies such as release through the habeas corpus 
procedure to be granted) and even where a specific power of review for compliance with 
international obligations and/or a remedy such as the declaration of incompatibility have 
not been made available to domestic courts, courts should provide an analysis and 
assessment of whether the particular legislation under consideration complies with 
international treaty obligations in respect of the right to liberty. This role comports 
with the historical role of the courts as the guardians of liberty. 
In playing this monitoring-type role domestic courts can provide guidance to 
Parliament and the executive in respect of future state practice and may also assist to 
inform wider public debate about the fundamental right to liberty. All four states under 
discussion are democratic states and limits on fundamental rights such as the right to 
liberty and the reasons for these should be openly discussed and debated. Any 
infringements on the right should be authorised by the express will of Parliament 
through clear legislation promoting democratic legitimacy and ultimately 
accountability. Courts can assist with ensuring that infringements on the right are 
carefully considered and democratically mandated. 
It is in domestic jurisdictions that detention occurs and where challenges to this are 
made at least in the first instance. Domestic courts have a responsibility, in the writer's 
view, to at least monitor states ' compliance with the internationally agreed limits on 
detention contained in the ICCPR. As discussed above there is wide support for domestic 
courts to take a role in at least monitoring states ' compliance with international treaties 
including in particular in relation to detention for the purpose of addressing security 
concerns. Domestic courts cannot ignore the actions of their states within the international 
arena, including in relation to security concerns raised by the international phenomenon of 
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the war on terrorism and the increasingly strict measures being taken worldwide to address 
these concerns. 
V CASE ANALYSES 
This paper now considers five recent decisions from the pre-eminent courts in the 
United Kingdom, the United States, Australia and New Zealand. The decisions from the 
United Kingdom, the United States and New Zealand considered issues around 
administrative and indefinite detention of persons assessed as posing security concerns. In 
the decision from Australia the appellant had been detained under immigration legislation 
for the reason that he was not a desired immigrant, failed to achieve refugee status and 
was not able to be deported elsewhere. The Australian decision however, provides an 
indication of the HCA' s view of the relevance of international obligations in relation to the 
court's consideration of a challenge to administrative and indefinite detention. 
The four cases reviewed below are not the only cases in recent times in the four 
jurisdictions under discussion to consider the right to liberty and its reconciliation with 
measures taken to deal with security or immigration concerns. All four cases do, however, 
illustrate the varying approaches taken in domestic courts (including between judges 
within the same jurisdiction) to the relevance of international obligations in domestic law. 
As discussed above, this paper does not attempt to resolve this issue in terms of a formalist 
view of what material courts can and cannot consider. Also, as discussed above, it is 
suggested that international treaty obligations are certainly relevant in an area such as the 
right to liberty with which the courts have played a central role for hundreds of years and 
are persuasive. Further, putting aside constitutional issues concerning the formal role of 
courts, these do not prevent courts from playing the monitoring role suggested by this 
paper. Superior courts in particular must play this role in respect to the fundamental right 
to liberty. 
The analysis in each case will consider in tum the procedural limit contained in 
article 9(1) ICCPR, the substantive question of arbitrary detention in article 9(1 ), and in 
respect of the derogation provision contained in article 4(1) ICCPR, the threshold 
requirement as well as the limit on the extent of measures which can be taken in 
contravention of article 9( 1 ). 
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A A and others v Secretary of State for the Home Department 
I Facts and findings 
The United Kingdom's obligations under the ECHR were incorporated into United 
Kingdom domestic law under the UKHRA by way of specific reference to provisions of 
that treaty, including that in article 5(1) concerning the right to liberty, as well as that in 
article 15(1) permitting derogation from the right. The UKHRA thus explicitly provides 
for review by the United Kingdom courts of the United Kingdom's compliance with its 
international obligations under both (in effect) treaties including specifically in respect of 
legislation. The remedy available following such a review is a declaration of 
incompatibility. 95 
Recently in A and others v Secretary of State for the Home Department96 the 
House of Lords was called upon to undertake such a review in relation to the right to 
liberty in respect of a group of persons who had been certified as "suspected international 
terrorists" by the Home Secretary under section 21 of the Anti-terrorism, Crime and 
Security Act 2001 (the ATCSA).97 None of the appellants faced criminal charges and in 
no case was a criminal trial in prospect. Deportation was also not an option for any of the 
appellants for various reasons. The consequence for the appellants was that they were 
then detained indefinitely pursuant to section 23 of that Act. 98 
Section 23 A TCSA specifically permitted indefinite detention of suspected 
international terrorists even where deportation or removal from the United Kingdom was 
not able to proceed for either legal or practical reasons. 
Section 23 A TCSA specifically applied to foreign nationals present in the United 
Kingdom and not to United Kingdom nationals. Prior legislation had allowed for 
95 UKI-IRA, s 4(2) . 
96 A and others v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2004] UKHL 56. 
97 Now repealed and replaced with the Prevention of Terrorism Act 2005 (UK). 
98 A and others v Secreta,y of State for the Home Department, above n 96, para 14; see also a summary of 
protections in the A TCSA for reviewing detention under that Act, para 15 . 
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detention of foreign nationals only for such time as was reasonable to allow deportation to 
be carried out. 99 
Shortly prior to the enactment of the A TCSA, the United Kingdom executive 
made the Human Rights Act 1998 (Designated Derogation) Order 2001 (the Derogation 
Order). This recognised that the power under the ATCSA to indefinitely detain a person 
against whom no action was being taken with a view to deportation may be inconsistent 
with article 5(1 )(f) ECHR. Notice of the steps taken to derogate from article 5(1) was also 
given to the Secretary-General of the Council of Europe and corresponding steps were 
taken to derogate from article 9(1) ICCPR. 100 
The Derogation Order referred to a "Public emergency in the United Kingdom" in 
respect of the attacks of 11 September 2001 and to UNSC resolutions recognising those 
attacks as a threat to international peace and security and requiring all states to take 
measures to prevent the commission of terrorist attacks. 101 The Derogation Order also 
referred to a terrorist threat in particular from "foreign nationals present in the United 
Kingdom" who are suspected of being involved in acts of terrorism, of being members of 
groups involved in acts of terrorism, or having links with such groups. 102 
In terms of compliance with the derogation provision in article 15(1) ECHR there 
were two issues before the court. These were first whether the threshold for derogation 
had been met, namely whether there existed a war or any other public emergency 
threatening the life of the nation; and second whether the detention of the appellants 
derogated from article 15(1) only to the extent strictly required by the exigencies of the 
situation and further whether this was inconsistent with other obligations the United 
Kingdom had under international law. 
99 R v Governor of Durham Prison, Exp Hardial Singh [ 1984] I WLR 704, para 8. 
100 A and others v Secretary of State for the Home Department, above n 96, para 11 . 
101 Schedule to the Derogation Order; referred to in A and others v Secretary of State for the Home 
Department, above n 96, para 11. 
102 Schedule to the Derogation Order; referred to in A and others v Secretary of State for the Home 
Department, above n 96, para 11 . 
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2 Whether there was a public emergency threatening the life of the nation 
The key judgment of the court is given by Lord Bingham. Lord Bingham 
concluded on the question of whether there existed a sufficient emergency by deferring to 
the judgement of the Home Secretary. 103 However, before doing so he reviewed a 
substantial number of authorities on point including international treaties and opinions. 
Lord Bingham also referred to several cases concerning measures taken in respect 
of the Irish Republican Army (IRA). In Lawless v Ireland (No 3) , 104 upon which he 
places heavy reliance, the ECtHR considered that the threshold would be met if there was 
"an exceptional situation of crisis or emergency which affects the whole population and 
constitutes a threat to the organised life of the community of which the State is 
composed". 105 This test was found to be met in that case in that there existed in the 
territory of the Republic of Ireland a secret army engaged in unconstitutional activities and 
using violence to attain its goals; this army was also operating outside the territory of the 
state thus seriously jeopardising the relations of the Republic oflreland with its neighbour; 
and there had been a steady and alarming increase in terrorist activities for a period of 
months. 106 In the other IRA cases discussed by Lord Bingham the threshold test was also 
found to have been met. 
In another case referred to by Lord Bingham, the Greek Case, 107 the European 
Human Rights Commission (European Commission) considered that the test required the 
emergency to be "actual or imminent", to affect "the whole nation", to threaten ''the 
continuance of the organised life of the community", and to be "exceptional". 
103 A and others v Secretary of State for the Home Department, above n 96, paras 28, 29, 118, 119 and 
154. 
104 lawless v Ireland (No 3) ( 1961) I EHRR 15 . 
105 lawless, above n 104, para 28 ; referred to in A and others v Secretary of State for the Home 
Department, above n 96, para 17. 
106 lawless, above n I 04, para 28 ; referred to in A and others v Secretary of State for the Home 
Department, above n 96, para 17; also see Ireland v United Kingdom (1978) 2 EHRR 25 where 17 
years later both the ECtHR and the European Commission again found the test was met in respect of 
the threat posed to the United Kingdom by the Irish Republican Army; referred to in A and others v 
Secretary of State for the Home Department, above n 96, para 18. 
107 Greek Case (1969) 12 YB I (European Commission); referred to in A and others v Secretary of State 
for the Home Department, above n 96, para 18. 
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Lord Bingham also refers to the Siracusa Principles.108 He accepts that valid 
derogation under either the ECHR or the ICCPR requires the threat to be imminent. 109 
Lord Bingham's judgment thus provides some guidance on this first question by 
way of review of relevant authorities which all strongly suggest that a high threshold 
applies though he then defers to the Home Secretary to decide whether the threshold has 
been met. The key reason in Lord Bingham's view for deferring to the executive was that, 
in his view, the question of whether a sufficient public emergency exists is one at the 
political end of the spectrum and that this question raises issues of relative institutional 
competence. 11 0 Such a consideration did not prevent the ECtHR and the European 
Commission considering this same question in the cases referred to. As well, the domestic 
courts in the United Kingdom now have clear jurisdiction to do so through the 
incorporation of the relevant provisions of the ECHR into domestic law via the UKHRA. 
It is also noted the court may not have been in a position to complete such an analysis, at 
least in any detail, given that it had not seen certain secret information which had been 
assessed at first instance by the Special Immigration Appeals Commission. 111 
3 Whether the measures were strictly required and whether these were consistent 
wUh other international law obligations 
The second question under the derogation provision in the ECHR relates to the 
extent of the measures taken which derogate from the right to liberty. Article 5(1 )(f) 
ECHR permits derogation by a state only to the "extent strictly required by the exigencies 
of the situation" and "provided that such measures are not inconsistent with its other 
obligations under international law". 
Lord Bingham described the applicable test as one of "strict necessity" which he 
said was in Convention terminology a "proportionality test". 11 2 He also mentions the 
concept of arbitrariness in conjunction with this test. 11 3 He described the applicable 
proportionality test as requiring consideration of whether the legislative objective is 
108 A and others v Secreta,y of State f or the Home Department, above n 96, para 19. 
109 A and others v Secretary of State f or the Home Department, above n 96, para 21. 
110 A and others v Secreta,y of State for the Home Department, above n 96, para 29 . 
111 A and others v Secretary of State f or the Home Department, above n 96, para 27 . 
11 2 A and others v Secretary of State f or the Home Department, above n 96, para 30 . 
113 A and others v Secretary of State for the Home Department, above n 96, para 30 . 
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sufficiently important to justify limiting a fundamental right (in this case the appellants 
accepted that to some extent it was 114), whether the measures are rationally connected to 
the objective and whether the means used impair the right or freedom do so no more than 
is necessary. 115 
Lord Bingham appeared particularly concerned in his discussion that there was 
evidence before the court that similar threats were posed by many United Kingdom 
nationals who were not subject to indefinite detention under the A TCSA. 116 Thus he said 
the legislation was discriminatory and discrimination was prohibited under the ECHR as 
well as the ICCPR. 117 He noted that the derogation provision in article 4 of the ICCPR 
specifically did not permit measures derogating from the Convention which were 
discriminatory. 118 Further, nor had the United Kingdom followed the derogation process 
under the ECHR relating to the discrimination issue. 119 Because of the discriminatory 
effect of the legislation the decision suggests that it was therefore not rationally connected 
to its objective which was presumably to counter terrorist threats. 12° Further, there were 
other means available for dealing with such threats as such measures had been employed 
against United Kingdom nationals who were considered to pose similar threats. 121 It was 
therefore questionable as to why detention was required in respect of foreign nationals. 122 
His Honour concluded that the decision to detain one group of persons considered 
to be security threats but not another could not be justified. 123 The discrimination issue 
was clearly of concern to a majority of the other Judges. 124 Lord Scott also considered 
that the government should have to show that monitoring arrangements or less severe 
movement restrictions would not suffice. 125 
11 4 A and others v Secretary of State for the Home Department, above n 96, paras 30 and 32. 
11 5 A and others v Secreta,y of State for the Home Department, above n 96, para 30 . 
11 6 A and others v Secretary of State for the Home Department, above n 96, para 32. 
11 7 A and others v Secretary of State for the Home Department, above n 96, para 63; art 14 and art 26 
respectively. 
11 8 A and others v Secretary of State for the Home Department, above n 96, para 60 . 
11 9 A and others v Secretary of State for the Home Department, above n 96, para 47 . 
120 A and others v Secretary of State for the Home Department, above n 96, para 33. 
121 A and others v Secreta,y of State for the Home Department, above n 96, para 35. 
12? - A and others v Secretary of State for the Home Department, above n 96, para 44 . 
123 A and others v Secretary of State for the Home Department, above n 96, para 68 . 
124 A and others v Secretary of State for the Home Department, above n 96, paras 84 , 132-138, 158, 159, 
188, 189, 231 and 236 . 
125 A and others v Secretary of State for the Home Department, above n 96, para 155 . 
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Lord Walker (in a minority of one) concluded that this second limb was also a 
matter for governmental discretion. 126 
4 Analysis 
The House of Lords has a clear mandate under the UKHRA to review the 
detention provisions in the A TCSA for compliance with the ECHR in respect of the right 
to liberty specifically including, unlike the other states under discussion, the derogation 
provision. The statutory mandate of this court in respect of international obligations is 
thus the widest of the four courts under discussion. 
Of the legislation under discussion the A TCSA most clearly permitted indefinite 
detention in certain circumstances for reasons of security. Thus the question did not arise 
in this case as to whether the procedural requirement of provision protecting the right to 
liberty in the ECHR ( or in effect article 9(1) ICCPR) was met. In other words, in terms of 
there being clear legislation authorising the detention of the appellants, it was in 
accordance with law. In this circumstance release through the habeas corpus process may 
not have been available and presumably this is why this was not dealt with in any detail by 
the court. However, concerns have been raised about the authority of the executive to 
indefinitely detain persons under the ATCSA. On this point Warbrick has commented: 127 
But the seriousness of what is involved in the Part 4 scheme can be lost in the details of 
the process. It authorises indefinite detention of persons on executive say so, on a low 
burden of suspicion, which can be justified in partly secret proceedings, inter alia, 
relying on intelligence material, including information which the Government might 
know had been obtained by torture. I go back to the beginning - the human rights 
components of the rule of law include the protection against the arbitrary exercise of 
power, even if the power has a formal legal base. 
The substantive requirement of article 9(1) ICCPR that detention not be arbitrary 
is not specified in article 5(1) ECHR. However, some commentators have said that article 
5(1) is subject to this requirement. 128 Lord Bingham does not deal with this point. If he 
126 A and others v Secreta,y of State for the Home Department, above n 96, paras 217 and 218 . 
127 Warbrick above n 2, 1013. 
128 Clayton & Tomlinson, above n 5, paras 10.90-10.92. 
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had done so, he may have concluded that habeas corpus was available. The derogation 
requirements of article 15(1) ECHR are the focus of Lord Bingham' sjudgment. 
Lord Bingham's review of the relevant case law and other authorities concerning 
the threshold test for derogation, namely whether a sufficient public emergency existed, is 
thorough. Implicit in this decision is an acceptance that while much of the international 
material referred to is not legally binding on the United Kingdom it is both relevant to the 
court and persuasive. 129 However, there is no analysis by him of precisely what factors in 
the then situation in the United Kingdom indicated that the test had been met. By 
comparison the Lawless v Ireland case relied on by Lord Bingham contained such an 
analysis. 
In respect of the threshold required for derogation it was considered by the 
majority that deference be shown to the executive in making the Derogation Order 
because it was said to be a question at the "political end of the spectrum".
130 It is 
suggested that even if it is appropriate to defer to executive on this issue it would have 
been useful for future guidance concerning a fundamental human right, for the court to 
have clarified precisely what, in the circumstances facing the United Kingdom at that 
time, amounted to an emergency involving actual and imminent danger threatening the life 
of the nation. 
Bearing this in mind it is of concern that Lord Bingham goes further than simply 
deferring to the executive and endorses its view that the threshold question had been met. 
He concludes that if the situation in most of the cases he had referred to, in particular the 
Lawless v Ireiand case amounted to such an emergency, then clearly the current situation 
following September 11 must do so. 131 It is noted that the Lawless v Ireland case involved 
what was described as "low-level terrorist activity".
132 Although, the threats facing the 
United Kingdom from the IRA at that time were apparently more extensive than those 
facing the United Kingdom in its home territory at the time this case was heard (as well as 
at present notwithstanding the recent bombings in London). In respect of the other cases 
reviewed by Lord Bingham he said: " [I]n each case the member state had actually 
129 A and others v Secretary of State for the Home Department1 above n 96, for example para 63. 
130 A and others v Secretary of State f or the Home Department, above n 96, para 29. 
131 A and others v Secretary of State for the Home Department, above n 96, para 28 ; see also para 44 . 
132 A and others v Secretary of State for the Home Department, above n 96, para I 7. 
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experienced widespread loss of life caused by an armed body dedicated to destroying the 
territorial integrity of the state. 133 This was not the case in the United Kingdom at the time 
this decision was released. As well, the long periods for which derogation was deemed 
acceptable with respect to Northern Ireland-related violence has been criticised. 134 
When compared with these cases, including Lawless v Ireland, as well as given the 
high threshold which must apply based upon the cases and the other material referred to 
by Lord Bingham, the conclusion that the situation facing the United Kingdom following 
9 September 2001 meets the test of being a sufficient public emergency is unsatisfactory. 
Further, the conclusion is questionable because Lord Bingham did not have full 
information before him concerning the nature, extent and imminence of terrorist threats to 
the United Kingdom. This information had been withheld from the Court. 135 It is thus 
difficult to see how the Court was in a position to assess whether the threat facing the 
United Kingdom met the high threshold the Court appeared to agree was required. 
It is suggested that rather than approving the decision of the Home Secretary, in 
particular without explaining the reasons why a sufficient public emergency existed in the 
then existing situation, if deference to the Home Secretary on this first question was 
appropriate the preferable course would have been to simply defer without also approving 
the decision. 
Better still however, it is suggested, Lord Bingham ought to have followed his 
fellow judge Lord Hoffman who commented: "Terrorist violence, serious as it is, does not 
threaten our institutions of government or our existence as a civil community". 136 The 
UKHRA gives the United Kingdom domestic courts clear jurisdiction to assess this 
question despite its political nature. Of all the courts under discussion the House of Lords 
had clear authority to go further than it did in monitoring the compliance of the United 
Kingdom with the specific limits which apply to the right to liberty under the ECHR (and 
effectively the ICCPR). This would have at least provided guidance for future state 
133 A and others v Secretary of State for the Home Department, above n 96, para 28. 
134 Gross "Once More into the Breach: the Systemic Failure of Applying the European Convention on 
Human Rights to Entrenched Emergencies" ( l 998) 23 YJIL 437; referred to in Warbrick, above n 2, 
1006. 
135 Though such information appears to have been available at first instance. 
136 A and others v Secretary of State for the Home Department, above n 96, paras 89 and 96. 
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practice and provided information for wider political and public debate on this important 
issue. 
Concerning the second limb of the derogation test as to the permissible extent of 
any measures derogating from the right to liberty, it is suggested that contrary to what 
Lord Bingham appears to be saying, a proportionality test does not entirely equate with a 
test of strict necessity. The words strict necessity logically arise from the words: "the 
extent strictly required by the exigencies of the situation". Although as the court was not 
aware of the full extent of the threat facing the country, because it did not have before it all 
the material the executive claimed to have to support the existence of a significant threat 
(as discussed above in respect of the first threshold test of whether a public emergency 
exists), it would have been difficult for it to assess whether the detention authorised by the 
A TCSA was strictly warranted or required by the exigencies of the situation. 137 The Court 
somewhat compromised its ability to assess the relationship between the claimed public 
emergency and the measures taken for dealing with it in terms of a strict necessity test by 
not being fully informed in respect of the whether a sufficient public emergency existed. 
The Court effectively ignored this issue and focused instead upon a proportionality test. 
Proportionality tests are commonly used for assessmg the justification of 
infringements on human rights. In this case a declaration of incompatibility was granted 
by the court because of the discriminatory nature of the detention provisions which 
applied only to foreign nationals. 
The question arises as to whether if the legislation had not been discriminatory, in 
other words if it had provided for both United Kingdom and foreign nationals to be 
detained following bring assessed as a security risk, would the detention have met the test 
of strict necessity. 
The courts in the United Kingdom may soon be asked to consider this issue 
following the enactment of the Prevention of Terrorism Act 2005 (Prevention of 
Terrorism Act) which replaced the A TCSA. This new legislation is not discriminatory but 
provides for the making of "control orders" by either the Secretary of State, or in the case 
137 Warbrick, above n 2, l O 14. 
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of what are termed "derogating control orders", by the High Court.
138 Derogating control 
orders can place obligations upon an individual even though these may be incompatible 
with the right to liberty under article 5 ECHR.
139 A person can be arrested and detained 
for up to 48 hours pending the making of a derogating control order by the High Court.
140 
The High Court can extend this period.
141 
Obligations which may be imposed by a control order include restrictions on 
movement within the United Kingdom 
142 which can include a requirement to remain at or 
within a particular place or area. 
143 Breach of such obligations is an offence punishable by 
fi · · 144 up to 1ve years 1mpnsonment. 
The obligations which may be imposed upon individuals by these orders are 
clearly draconian though the discriminatory aspects of the A TCSA have been removed. 
The questions still remain as to whether the substantive requirement of arbitrariness is 
infringed or not and whether the test for derogation has been met justifying such measures 
in the current war on terrorism. 
While the new legislation does provide for some court oversight, when 
considering these new orders the High Court will be bound to accept the House of Lords 
decision under discussion on the wider questions concerning whether such detention is 
strictly necessary in the current circumstances. The bombings in London earlier this year 
can only strengthen the view that what are draconian measures are justifiable. But it is not 
clear at all, in the writer's view, that a sufficient public emergency exists and that such 
powers are necessary. One incident, said to be the work of the terrorists with whom the 
United Kingdom and the United States are currently are war, has occurred on each of the 
territories of these two states. While both these incidents were completely unjustifiable, 
neither are on the scale of the threats faced by many nations in the second world war or by 
the United Kingdom during the years of regular attacks by the IRA. If any case concerning 
138 Prevention of Terrorism Act 2005 (UK), s I (I) & (2) . 
139 Prevention of Terrorism Act 2005 (UK), s I (2)(a). 
140 Prevention of Terrorism Act 2005 (UK), s 5. 
141 Prevention ofTerrorism Act 2005 (UK), s 5(4). 
142 Prevention of Terrorism Act 2005 (UK), s I (4)(g). 
143 Prevention of Terrorism Act 2005 (UK), s I (5) . 
144 Prevention ofTerrorism Act 2005 (UK), s 9(4)(a). 
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these new orders reaches the House of Lords it will also be constrained to a significant 
extent by its failure to deal with such issues in the present case. 
The House of Lords considered that deference to the executive was not appropriate 
concerning the discrimination issue because of its role under the UKHRA and the 
historical role of the courts in protecting liberty.
145 It is not clear why these factors do not 
support the justiciability of the remainder of the derogation test particularly given the clear 
mandate in the UKHRA. Discrimination issues, important as they are, have in effect been 
given some precedence over the fundamental right to liberty by this decision. 
Because of express authorisation by way of the UKHRA the United Kingdom' s 
international obligations in respect of the right to liberty were relevant to the court's 
consideration of legislation permitting indefinite detention. Despite this mandate, by 
failing to assess the derogation tests fully, the House of Lords has in effect conceded 
that it has only a limited role in respect of executive compliance with the ECHR. 
Although it is positive to note the encouragement given by the court to the use of means 
short of detention for dealing with security issues. 
B Hamdi v Rumsfeld and Rasul v Bush 
I Facts and.findings: Hamdi v Rumsfeld 
The petitioner in Hamdi v Rumsfeld146 was the father of an American citizen (also 
Mr Hamdi) who had been captured in Afghanistan and had allegedly taken up arms with 
the Taliban. Mr Hamdi Qunior) was being detained in the United States after being 
removed from Afghanistan. He had been classified as an "enemy combatant"
147 and had 
been detained for over two years as at the date of the decision of the USSC. The United 
States government provided the court at first instance with a declaration from a 
government official stating that Mr Hamdi had been affiliated with a Taliban unit which 
had engaged in hostilities with Northern Alliance forces in Afghanistan and when the 
145 A and others v Secretary of State for the Home Department, above n 96, paras 36 and 42 . 
146 Hamdi v Rumsfeld, above n 15. 
147 Hamdi v Rumsfeld, above n 15, 8 O ' Connor J ; this categorisation appears to be accepted by the 
majority though it is noted in the judgment that the government has never provided any court with the 
full criteria it uses in classifying individuals as such. 
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Taliban unit surrendered to those forces Mr Hamdi had surrendered to them a Kalishnikov 
assault rifle. 
The majority accepted that there was sufficient authority for Mr Hamdi's detention 
as an enemy combatant pursuant to a Congressional resolution, namely the Authorization 
for Use of Military Force (AUMF), 
148 which allowed the President to use all necessary 
and appropriate force against persons he determines planned, authorised, committed or 
aided in the September 11 attacks.
149 The majority said that the AUMF permitted 
detention only of the "narrow category" of individuals determined to be enemy 
combatants. 150 The decision also appears to be limited to those who are United States 
citizens. 151 Souter J ( dissenting in part) and Scalia J ( dissenting) both concluded that the 
AUMF was not sufficiently clear to permit detention.
152 
The majority also noted that the "war on terror" was an "unconventional war" and 
seemed to accept the possibility that Mr Hamdi's detention could last for the rest of his 
life. 153 This raised the issue of indefinite detention to which the majority's answer was 
that detention of such individuals could "last no longer than active hostilities".
154 The 
purpose of detaining enemy combatants was described by the majority as an incident of 
war with the purpose of preventing captured individuals returning to the field of battle. 
155 
This case differs from the other cases under discussion in that the majority of the 
USSC explicitly accepted that the government was engaged in a war. The majority also 
accepted that active combat operations against Taliban fighters were ongoing in 
Afghanistan. 156 Thus the war which could justify detention was not necessarily the wider 
war on terrorism. 
148 Authorization for Use of Military Force 115 Stat 224 (2001). 
149 HamdivRumsfeld, above n 15, 8- 12, 14 and 16 O'Connor J. 
150 Hamdi v Rumsfeld, above n 15, 9, I 0, 12 and 16 O'Connor J. 
15 1 Hamdi v Rumsfeld, above n 15, 9 O' Connor J. 
152 Hamdi v Rumsfeld, above n 15, 9-13 and 22-26 respectively. 
153 Hamdi v Rumsfeld, above n 15, 12 O'Connor J. 
154 Hamdi v Rumsfeld, above n 15, 12 O' Connor J; several authorities for this proposition are referred to 
including the Geneva Convention (III), art 118. 
155 Hamdi v Rumsfeld, above n 15, 10 O 'Connor J; though the majority stated that there were limits on 
what could occur during detention for example interrogation was not permissible, 13 O ' Connor J. 
156 Hamdi v Rumsfeld, above n 15, 13 O'Connor J. 
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The majority held that, even as an enemy combatant, because Mr Hamdi was a 
citizen he was entitled to due process rights under the fifth Amendment to the US 
Constitution namely to have a meaningful opportunity to contest the factual basis for the 
detention before a neutral decision maker. 157 It was on this basis that the decision below 
was vacated. The majority also notes that the parties agreed that the writ of habeas corpus 
remained available to individuals detained within the United States. 158 
The government argued that a challenge to Mr Hamdi's detention should proceed 
on the basis of the finding of the Fourth Circuit Court's holding at first instance that it was 
"undisputed" that Mr Hamdi was seized in a combat zone, or on the basis of a "very 
deferential "some evidence" standard". 159 The majority did not accept this. However, in 
respect of the latter the majority accepted that aside from core elements, enemy combatant 
proceedings may need to be tailored in order to alleviate their uncommon potential to 
burden the executive at a time of military conflict. 160 The court was firm that during the 
process of challenging his detention Mr Hamdi "unquestionably has the right to access to 
counsel". 161 
The majority accepted that the US Constitution gave the executive and the 
legislature control over war making but rejected a heavily circumscribed role for the 
courts saying: 162 
We have long since made clear that a state of war is not a blank check for the President 
when it comes to the rights of the Nation's citizens. 
And further: 163 
... the Great Writ of habeas corpus allows the Judicial Branch to play a necessary role 
in maintaining this delicate balance of governance, serving as an important judicial 
check on the Executive 's discretion in the realm of detentions. 
157 Hamdi v Rumsfe/d, above n 15 , 17, 24 and 26 O' Connor J. 
158 Hamdi v Rumsfeld, above n 15 , 18 O 'Connor J. 
159 Hamdi v Rumsfe/d, above n 15, 19- 26 and 30 O'Connor J. 
160 Hamdi v Rumsfeld, above n 15, 27, 28 and 29 O'Connor J. 
16 1 Hamdi v Rumsfeld, above n 15, 32 O' Connor J. 
162 Hamdi v Rumsfeld, above n 15, 29 O'Connor J. 
163 Hamdi v Rumsfeld, above n 15, 29- 30 O'Connor J. 
44 
The majority referred to the Geneva Convention (III). None of the judges referred 
to the ICCPR though arguably the latter is as relevant to the issues before the court as the 
former. 
Souter J ( dissenting in part) discusses the test for limiting the right to liberty under 
the US Constitution. He did not accept that there was evidence that Hamdi posed an 
"imminent threat" or that there was a sufficient "emergency" permitting his detention to 
continue. 164 Scalia J ( dissenting) cites from Blackstone who opined that executive 
detention may be necessary when the state is in "real danger" and Parliament can suspend 
the habeas corpus but only in a case of "extreme emergency". 165 Scalia J's view was that 
that the AUMF did not amount to the latter and that Mr Hamdi was therefore entitled to a 
habeas corpus decree requiring his release. 166 Thus without resort to article 4(1) ICCPR 
Souter and Scalia JJ require similar limits imposed by this on any action by the executive 
detaining a United States citizen. 
2 Facts and findings: Rasul v Bush 
Mr Rasul was a foreign national who was being held in Guantanamo Bay. This 
decision did not address the reasons for his detention as these were not at issue. The 
decision simply addressed a jurisdictional point, namely whether habeas corpus was 
available to aliens detained outside of the United States. Though the United States has 
complete control of an area of land in Guantanamo Bay pursuant to a lease with the Cuban 
government it does not have sovereignty over that area. 
The majority held that habeas corpus was available to aliens detained at 
Guantanamo Bay and the case was remanded back to the Federal District Court for 
hearing of the habeas corpus application. 167 Scalia J ( dissenting) concluded that the 
detainees were not located within the territorial jurisdiction of any federal court and thus 
habeas corpus was not available. 168 
164 Hamdi v Rumsfeld, above n 15, 14- 15 Souter J. 
165 Hamdi v Rumsfeld, above n 15, 9 Scalia J, 
166 Hamdi v Rumsfeld, above n 15, 21 Scalia J. 
167 Hamdi v Rumsfeld, above n 15 , 6-8 O'Connor J. 
168 Hamdi v Rumsfeld, above n 15, I O Scalia J. 
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3 Analysis 
In neither case do the judges refer to the limits on the right to liberty contained in 
the ICCPR despite the United States having ratified this treaty and despite article VI 
clause 2 of the US Constitution which provides that treaties made by the United States 
shall be the supreme law of the land. The failure to at least recognise the international 
obligations of the United States is startling in the context of the international nature of the 
war on terrorism. 
The Geneva Convention (III) is mentioned in the majority judgment. It is 
unsatisfactory for a court to pick and choose what material it will consider. If international 
treaties are considered relevant then all relevant treaties should be considered. Even 
though the court in this case accepted that the state was at war and therefore the treaty 
referred to by it is directly relevant to such circumstances, the UNHRC has made clear that 
the ICCPR applies to all forms of detention. The ICCPR is clearly also relevant 
particularly concerning the category of enemy combatants which may not be covered by 
the Geneva Conventions. 
The procedural requirement of article 9(1) ICCPR was in effect considered by all 
the judges deciding Mr Hamdi's case in the determination of whether the AUMF was 
sufficiently clear to authorise his detention. There were differences of opinion on this 
point though the majority considered it was. UNHRC jurisprudence suggests that 
detention contrary to the requirements of the ICCPR must be clearly expressed in 
legislation. 169 Consideration of the UNHRC's jurisprudence may have made a difference 
to the majority view on this point. 
Even if the AUMF provided sufficient legislative authority to detain Mr Hamdi, it 
is suggested that given the provision in the US Constitution concerning treaties and given 
the fundamental nature of the human right to liberty, the Court should have at least 
acknowledged the international obligations of the United States under the ICCPR. 
Further, the court should have provided some guidance as to whether, in its view, the 
circumstances the United States faced fighting the war on terrorism met the required tests, 
169 Refer above n 35 and n 36 . 
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both in terms of the substantive requirement of article 9( 1) and the derogation provision in 
article 4(1 ). If domestic courts do not at least play this monitoring role political and public 
debate about this important issue is impaired and ultimately the accountability of the 
legislature. 
The US Constitution protects the right to liberty. It might be suggested that this is 
sufficient and that the protection of this right under the ICCPR thus does not need to be 
incorporated into United States domestic law. Further, that legislation which is 
inconsistent with this right can be ruled as unconstitutional by the courts and this remedy 
provides significant protection of the right. The answer to this view is that the IC CPR was 
ratified by the United States more recently and it provides agreement by it as to specific 
and narrow limits which are permissible when restricting the right to liberty. Such limits 
are not provided for in the US Constitution. The ratification of the ICCPR with its 
specific limits on the right to liberty is at least worthy of comment by the court even if in 
its view the AUMF is sufficiently clear to authorise detention and thereby implicitly 
removing the possibility of release via the habeas corpus procedure. 
The decision in Mr Rasul's case is positive, setting aside the debatable legal issue 
concerning whether territorial limits apply to domestic courts, in that it supports the 
concept of the universality of human rights by extending habeas corpus to aliens. 
However, should he make an application for habeas corpus it is unlikely he will succeed, 
as similarly to Mr Hamdi, he is being detained pursuant to the AUMF and the USSC has 
decided that this provides sufficient authorisation for the lawful detention of enemy 
combatants. 
A key element missing from the decision relating to Mr Hamdi is comment by the 
court that other means could have been employed to ensure that he did not either return to 
the field of battle pose security risks within the United States. This omission does not sit 
well with the court's historical role as ~he guardian ofliberty. 
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C Al-Kateb v Godwin 
1 Facts and findings 
The appellant in Al-Kateb v Godwin170 arrived in Australia in mid-December 2000 
without a passport or a visa. Section 189 of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) (Migration Act) 
describes such persons as unlawful non-citizens and provides for mandatory detention of 
such persons. Section 196 of the Migration Act provides that the detention shall continue 
until one of three options occurs. These are removal, deportation, or the granting of a visa. 
The appellant had been refused a visa and had been detained for two years while the 
authorities made attempts to remove or deport him from Australia. During this time the 
authorities had been unable to find a country willing to take him. His release had then 
been ordered by the Federal Court prior to the appeal to the HCA. There was no evidence 
before the court that the appellant was suspected of involvement in terrorist or other 
criminal activities or otherwise posed safety or security concerns. 
McHugh J, Hayne J and Callinan J (all in the majority) considered that the words 
in the relevant provisions of the Migration Act were clear and unambiguous and should 
not be read as subject to fundamental rights. 171 Further, that the detention authorised by 
the Migration Act extended to indefinite detention in the circumstances of being unable to 
remove a person from the country. 172 
The second issue of concern to the majority was whether the legislation had been 
lawfully enacted. McHugh J finds that the Migration Act was enacted within the 
legislative power under the Australian Constitution.173 He then makes clear his view that 
the Australian Constitution cannot be read by reference to the provisions of international 
law. 174 Further, he says, because these have been accepted since the Australian 
170 AI-Kateb v Godwin, [2004] HCA 37. 
171 AI-Kateb v Godwin, above n 170, paras 33, 35, 231, 241 and 298. 
172 Al-Kateb v Godwin, above n 170, paras 31, 33, 35, 240, 241, 297 and 298. 
173 Al-Kateb v Godwin, above n 170, paras 44-46 and 48; referring to Australian Constitution, s 51 (xix) 
which provides Parliament with the power "to make laws for the peace, order, and good government of 
the Commonwealth with respect to .. . .. . aliens". 
174 It is clear from the context that McHugh J is referring to international law ru les concerning human 
rights. 
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Constitution was enacted in 1900, taking account of them would amount to the courts 
amending the Constitution under the guise of interpretation. 175 
McHugh J says that rules of international law, which existed at the date the 
Australian Constitution was enacted, might in some cases throw some light on the 
meaning of a constitutional provision. 176 Further, that where the language of a statute 
permits, it should be interpreted and applied in conformity with long established rules of 
international law for the reason that the legislature is taken not to have intended to 
legislate in violation of international rules existing at the time the statute was enacted. 177 
However, he says, Parliament may legislate in disregard of this implication. 178 McHugh's 
view was that it is not for courts to determine whether the course taken by Parliament is 
unjust, unwise or contrary to basic human rights. 179 
Hayne J (also in the majority) notes that article 9 ICCPR only requires detention to 
be in accordance with a procedure established by law and that the detention be able to be 
readily tested in a court. 180 
Gleeson CJ ( dissenting) considered that the correct approach was to apply a 
fundamental principle of interpretation which was not to impute an intention to abrogate 
or curtail certain human rights or freedoms ( of which he said liberty was the most basic) 
unless such an intention is clearly manifested by unambiguous language which indicates 
that the legislature has directed its mind to the rights or freedoms in question and has 
consciously decided upon abrogation or curtailment. 181 Gleeson CJ considered there was 
a gap or silence in the Migration Act concerning the possibility of indefinite detention. 182 
Gumm ow J ( dissenting) agreed stating that if a point has been reached where removal is 
not reasonably practicable then the Act no longer mandates detention. 183 
175 Al-Kateb v Godwin, above n 170, paras 62 and 74. 
176 AI-Kateb v Godwin, above n 170, para 62. 
177 Al-Kateb v Godwin, above n 170, para 63. 
178 Al-Kateb v Godwin, above n 170, para 66. 
179 Al-Kateb v Godwin, above n 170, para 74. 
180 Al-Kateb v Godwin, above n 170, paras 238 and 297. 
181 AI-Kateb v Godwin, above n 170, paras 18 and 19. 
182 A 1-Kateb v Godwin, above n 170, para 21. 
183 AI-Kateb v Godwin, above n 170, paras 121 - 125 . 
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( dissenting) agreed that a point had been reached where detention was no longer 
"Parliament's command". 184 
Kirby J also stated that the Migration Act can be construed to not permit unlimited 
executive detention and that this is consistent with the principles of the international law of 
human rights and fundamental freedoms. 185 He said that courts have a duty, as far as 
possible, to interpret constitutional texts consistently with these. 186 He suggests that it is 
important to recognise that both the common law and international law have a 
presumption in favour of personal liberty. 187 
2 Analysis 
The majority decision of the HCA found that the Migration Act was sufficiently 
clear to permit the detention of the appellant, that the legislation had met Constitutional 
requirements, and that this was the necessary end of the court's enquiry. 
Similarly to the United States decision, if it is correct that the legislation was 
sufficiently clear to authorise even the indefinite detention of Mr Al-Kateb, it would have 
met the procedural requirement in article 9(1) ICCPR that limits on the right to liberty be 
established by law. Hayne J appears to take the view that this requirement had been met. 
He does not refer to the other requirements of the ICCPR in relation to the right to liberty. 
He does refer to the Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees
188 (Refugee 
Convention). As suggested in respect of the United States decision above, it is 
unsatisfactory for a court to pick and choose which international treaties it will consider. 
If it is considered permissible to consider these at all then all relevant treaties, in particular 
the ICCPR in relation to the right to liberty, should be considered. 
The judges in the minority considered the words in the Migration Act relied upon 
by the executive were not sufficiently clear to authorise indefinite detention. These judges 
also considered that in these circumstances the Act should be interpreted on the basis of a 
184 A l-Kateb v Godwin, above n 170, para 149. 
185 Al-Kateb v Godwin, above n 170 para 193. 
186 AI-Kateb v Godwin, above n 170, paras 175 and 180. 
187 AI-Kateb v Godwin, above n 170, para 150. 
188 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees (1951) 189 UNTS 150. 
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presumption that Parliament would not have intended to legislate in non-compliance with 
its international obligations. 189 However, Australia does not have a statutory equivalent of 
section 3 UKHRA requiring this analysis by the courts. Where judges find a gap in 
legislation of course the common law protection of the right to liberty is a legal basis upon 
which to not mandate the legality of detention. 
None of the judges in this case considered either by direct reference or in effect the 
substantive requirement of article 9(1) (prohibition against arbitrary detention) nor the 
derogation provision in article 4(1) ICCPR. 
Australia has signed the Optional Protocol. It has been the subject of a number of 
cases before the UNHRC concerning the Migration Act. 190 In these decisions Australia 
has been criticised in respect of both the procedural and substantive requirements of article 
9(1). 
Four decisions of the UNHRC have specifically considered the issue of mandatory 
detention under Australia's Migration Act. In all four cases the detention of the 
applicants, in each case for over two years including in respect of children, was found to 
be arbitrary and contrary to article 9(1). 191 The UNHRC said that Australia had not 
demonstrated that less invasive means could not be used to achieve the same ends, for 
example, by the imposition of reporting obligations, sureties and other conditions.
192 
Of the states under discussion Australia has the least formal legal basis for courts 
to look to international law for interpretation purposes. Australia's international 
obligations have not been incorporated into domestic law and it does not protect the right 
to liberty by way of the Australian Constitution, a Bill of Rights or other legislation. 
Protection of the right at common law can be overridden by legislation. 
The bases on which international obligations are considered to be relevant by 
Kirby J are in his view that: constitutional law cannot be isolated from international law, 
189 Al-Kateb v Godwin, above n 170, paras 19 and 150. 
190 See above n 16 and n 42 . 
191 A v Australia, above n 42, para 9.4; C v Australia, above n 16, para 8.2 ; Baban et al v Australia, 
above n 16, para 8.2 ; and Bakhtiyari v Australia, above n 16, para 9.3. 
192 C v Australia, above n 16, para 8.2; Saban et al v Australia, above n 16, para 7.2 ; and Bakhtiyari v 
Australia, above n 16, para 9.3. 
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the understanding of the former is constantly changing, and through the process of 
interpretation courts can adapt the law for changing times. 193 While this view has support 
elsewhere (such as in the NZSC), in the Australian context it is not as compelling given 
the lack of any statutory basis to do so. Though this does not prevent the monitoring role 
suggested by this paper. 
It is not sufficient for the majority judges in this decision to ignore Australia's 
treaty obligations as well as the directly relevant jurisprudence from the UNHRC. 
Recognition should have been given to these if only by way of the monitoring role 
suggested by this paper, as being the least domestic courts can do to provide guidance to 
the legislature and the executive and to assist informed debate amongst the public of 
Australia, on a question of fundamental human rights. 
D Zaoui v Attorney-General and the Superintendent, Auckland Central Remand 
Prison 
1 Facts and findings 
The decision in Zaoui v Attorney-General and the Superintendent, Auckland 
Central Remand Prison 194 included consideration of the court's inherent jurisdiction to 
grant bail or order release through the habeas corpus process. This case was most similar 
to the Australian case concerning Mr Al-Kateb in that Mr Zaoui arrived in New Zealand 
without a valid passport, claimed refugee status and was detained while his claim to that 
status was considered. However, as with the cases in the United Kingdom and the United 
States, in the New Zealand government's view Mr Zaoui was a security risk. Before an 
appeal against an adverse determination of refugee status could be heard the Director of 
Security issued a security risk certificate based upon classified security information under 
section 114D of the Immigration Act.
195 The Minister of Immigration then made a 
preliminary decision to rely upon the certificate. Mr Zaoui sought a review of the 
certificate and an interlocutory decision was issued. Mr Zaoui filed judicial review 
193 Al-Kateb v Godwin, above n 170, paras 169, 170, 178 and 190. 
194 Zaoui v Attorney-General and the Superintendent, Auckland Central Remand Prison, above n 3. 
195 The criteria for issuing of a security risk certificate relating to suspected terrorists or those who are 
otherwise a danger to security or public order are contained in s l l 4C(2). 
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proceedings in respect of that decision seeking clarification as to whether the review of the 
certificate should include consideration of relevant human rights concerns. 
During the course of those proceedings Mr Zaoui was detained in prison pursuant 
to a warrant of commitment issued by a District Court judge under section 1140 of the 
Immigration Act. That provision requires a judge to issue the warrant of commitment 
unless the judge is satisfied that the person before the court is not the person in respect of 
which the certificate was issued. The section therefore requires mandatory detention 
similarly to the Australian legislation discussed above. Mr Zaoui' s detention continued for 
nearly two years as proceedings concerning both the review of the security risk certificate 
and the lawfulness of his detention progressed through the court hierarchy. During that 
process the Refugee Status Appeals Authority determined that Mr Zaoui was a refugee. 196 
The NZSC held that the part of the Immigration Act relevant to Mr Zaoui ' s 
detention was not sufficiently clear to have the result that the inherent jurisdiction of the 
High Court to grant bail 197 was excluded. 198 The court was further of the view that where 
statutory provisions appear less than comprehensive the courts must do their best to give 
them a workable meaning and that any powers of detention should be approached in light 
of the fundamental right, long recognised under the common law, of liberty for all persons 
subject only to such limits as are imposed by law. 199 
The NZSC said there was a presumption that legislation was to be interpreted 
consistently with New Zealand' s obligations under international law and refers to the 
Refugee Convention.200 The ICCPR is not referred to at all in the judgment. 
196 Zaoui v Attorney-General and the Superintendent, Auckland Central Remand Prison, above n 3, 
para 9. 
197 The power to grant bail to someone detained is an ancient common law jurisdiction exercised by 
superior courts in England in both civil and criminal cases and which jurisdiction became part of New 
Zealand law in 1840 pursuant to the English Laws Act 1858; the power has devolved in New Zealand 
on the High Court pursuant to s 16 Judicature Act 1908 preceded by the Supreme Court Ordinances of 
1841 and 1844 and the Supreme Court Acts of 1860 and 1882: Zaoui v Attorney-General and the 
Superintendent, Auckland Central Remand Prison, above n 3, para 34 . 
198 Zaoui v Attorney-General and the Superintendent, Auckland Central Remand Prison, above n 3, 
paras 36, 37, 44 and 69. 
199 Zaoui v Attorney-General and the Superintendent, Auckland Central Remand Prison, above n 3, 
paras 32 and 52 . 
200 Zaoui v Attorney-General and the Superintendent, Auckland Central Remand Prison, above n 3, 
para 44. 
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Concerning national security, the court said that this may be one reason for 
continuing detention, but that it cannot provide a basis for blanket exclusion of entitlement 
to challenge detention.201 Further, the court said that strong statutory language is required 
to defeat the entitlement to challenge detention.202 
2 Analysis 
The ICCPR is not mentioned at all in the New Zealand decision. However, 
section 22 of the NZBORA, which incorporates the right to liberty as defined and limited 
in article 9(1) ICCPR (including the substantive requirement that detention not be 
otherwise arbitrary), is referred to. Even on a formalist view of the courts' role under the 
NZBORA, similarly to the courts in the United Kingdom, New Zealand courts have a 
statutory mandate to review compliance with article 9(1) ICCPR. 
The decision does in effect consider the procedural requirement of article 9(1) 
although it does not consider at all either the concept of arbitrariness or the derogation 
provision in article 4(1 ). 
The derogation provision in article 4(1) ICCPR is not incorporated into New 
Zealand's domestic law. Nevertheless, this aspect is clearly relevant to courts in New 
Zealand given the statement by the NZSC that there is a presumption that legislation is to 
be interpreted consistently with New Zealand's international obligations. The NZSC has 
not limited this to those aspects of New Zealand's obligations which have been 
incorporated into domestic law by way of legislation. 
New Zealand, like Australia, is a signatory to the Optional Protocol and thus 
decisions by our courts concerning rights recognised within the ICCPR are able to be 
further considered by the UNHRC. The resulting persuasive nature of UNHRC 
jurisprudence has been recognised in comments by President Cooke (as he then was) and 
Justice Tipping concerning the UNHRC being in effect part of New Zealand's judicial 
20 1 Zaoui v Attorney-General and the Superintendent, Auckland Central Remand Prison, above n 3, 
paras 44 and 51 . 
202 Zaoui v Attorney-General and the Superintendent, Auckland Central Remand Prison, above n 3, 
para 44. 
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structure (mentioned above).203 However, none of this jurisprudence was discussed by the 
NZSC. 
By the time the NZSC heard Mr Zaoui's application for bail and habeas corpus he 
had been found to be a refugee by the Refugee Status Appeals Authority. The NZSC may 
have considered that in these circumstances the Refugee Convention was directly relevant 
and there was therefore no need to consider the ICCPR. However, as has been discussed 
above the UNHRC have made clear that both article 9(1) and article 4(1) ICCPR apply to 
all forms of detention including where this is for the purpose of controlling immigration or 
in respect of security concems.204 
Mr Zaoui was released on bail because the Immigration Act was not in the 
NZSC's view sufficiently clear to displace its inherent jurisdiction to grant this. Although 
the court recognised that its inherent jurisdiction to grant bail can be displaced by clear 
legislation.205 For Mr Zaoui and his supporters the correct result was reached by the 
NZSC. However, it is suggested that the court missed an opportunity to provide guidance 
concerning the specific limits on detention contained within the ICCPR. Such guidance 
would have been valuable for future state practice including the drafting and enactment of 
legislation (which it is suggested is one likely result of this decision), as well as to both the 
High Court and Court of Appeal who may need to consider similar issues in the future. 
But also importantly, this would also have been valuable for informing wider public 
debate at a time where the right to liberty is under increasing challenge in New Zealand 
and around the world. 
Habeas corpus was not discussed in any detail by the NZSC presumably because 
this remedy was unnecessary given the finding that bail was available. 
VI CONCLUSION 
The international obligations under the ICCPR of each of the four states need to be 
given greater recognition by domestic courts even where these have not been incorporated 
203 See above n 12 and n 13 respectively. 
204 See above n 28 . 
205 Zaoui v Attorney-Genera/ and the Superintendent, Auckland Central Remand Prison, above n 3, 
paras 36 and 41. 
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into domestic law, either in part or in full, and even where no specific remedy is available 
in terms of release of detainees either because the legislation authorising detention is clear 
or where other alternative remedies have not been provided to the courts. Domestic courts 
have played a role for hundreds of years as the guardians of liberty and for the reasons 
discussed above cannot simply ignore the treaty obligations entered into by their 
respective states. Certainly when superior courts are called on to consider legislation 
which does not comply with the requirements of the ICCPR a thorough analysis and 
assessment of these is warranted despite constitutional issues which arise concerning the 
role of the courts vis a vis Parliament. 
Legislation claimed to authorise executive detention needs to be clear in order that 
such detention is the will of Parliament. It is debatable, for example, whether the AUMF 
was sufficiently clear to authorise indefinite detention in comparison with the A TCSA and 
Australia's Migration Act. Though even in respect of the latter some judges considered 
there to be a gap in the legislation. The court's interpretation role is important to ensure 
that executive action in respect of detention, in the circumstances discussed in this paper, 
is specifically mandated by the legislature. This is recognised by both Lord Bingham and 
Scalia J. 
Courts should not endorse executive action which infringes the right to liberty 
pursuant to generally worded legislation. It is permissible for domestic courts to challenge 
the executive in this respect, even on a fonnalist view of the appropriate role for courts, as 
the issue of legality of executive action has been the proper concern of courts for hundreds 
of years including in this important area. 
Where words in legislation are sufficiently clear to authorise detention in 
circumstances such as in the cases which have been discussed domestic courts must play a 
role of at least recognising the existence of both the internationally agreed substantive 
limit on detention (that it not be arbitrary) as well as the permissible derogation (that a 
high threshold applies to when the right to liberty can be limited and to what extent it can 
be limited) contained in the ICCPR. These matters are at least worthy of comment by 
judges consistent with the historic role played by judges in this area. Lord Bingham's 
judgment provides a model for courts to follow in this respect. Although in the United 
Kingdom as well as in New Zealand, courts have been given a statutory mandate to do 
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this, article IV clause 2 of the US Constitution also provides some legal basis for this role 
in the United States. Even in Australia a monitoring role is warranted even though the 
substantive result of particular cases will be unchanged given the lack of specific remedies 
available to the Australian courts where legislation is clear in authorising detention. 
This monitoring role is important, even where it does not make a difference to the 
substantive result of particular cases, as it at least provides guidance for state practice as 
well as assisting informed debate within democratic societies about any limits placed on 
the right to liberty. 
The concerns expressed during the drafting of the ICCPR and more recently by 
various human rights bodies about the increasing use of detention to manage security 
concerns cannot be ignored by domestic courts. Though mechanisms exist internationally 
for challenging detention (including pursuant to clear legislation) which does not conform 
with the requirements in the ICCPR, it is in domestic jurisdictions where detention occurs 
and domestic courts must play a role in ensuring that infringements on the right to liberty 
are democratically mandated through clear legislation and that Parliaments who choose to 
legislate in contravention of their international obligations do so openly and are thus are 
democratically accountable for such decisions. 
The current war on terrorism does not require the substantial infringements on the 
right to liberty which are seen in the cases which have been discussed. Following the 
second world war the then members of the UNGA unanimously agreed to narrow limits 
on this fundamental right allowing only for derogation in a time of public emergency. 
Some of the judges in the cases under discussion accepted that we are currently facing 
such an emergency. This is clearly not the case. None of the states under discussion has 
declared a state of emergency as required by the UNHRC's General Comment 29. The 
threshold for derogating from the right to liberty has not been met. As serious as terrorism 
is, it is not threatening the existence of the four states which have been discussed, or even 
causing serious inconvenience to the day to day lives of the people within these states. 
We are not at war. We are facing increasing incidents of serious criminal activity which 
states rightly are concerned about and need to counter. 
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The more serious threat facing the four states under discussion, compared to the 
current levels of terrorist activity in the world, is the undermining of the rule of law and 
democratic and human rights principles which have become central to both the legal and 
ethical underpinnings of our societies. Domestic courts need to play a role in challenging 
the current perceived need to infringe on fundamental human rights including the right to 
liberty in the war on terrorism. As part of this role domestic courts need to give increased 
recognition to the internationally agreed limits which are permissible in respect of the right 
to liberty even where they do not have the formal legal means to release detainees or to 
declare legislation permitting indefinite detention, on mere suspicion, without trial as 
incompatible or inconsistent with the right to liberty as this is defined and circumscribed 
by the ICCPR. 
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